469px-A Good Riddance King George V cartoon in Punch 1917By and © Louise Armstrong MA

This dissertation seeks to examine if the view of Germans as the "other" was embraced by the population of England during the period 1900-1915. It will examine whether the idea of Germany and its citizens as a race in opposition to England was built up over time by writers, journalists and the rhetoric of the state. The "other" as a concept will be analysed through its origination in philosophy through to the work of Edward W. Said and beyond. In order to assess if such an "othering" of Germany was indeed constructed, late nineteenth century history and English society will be assessed. Views on Eugenics and social Darwinism will be looked at alongside the fallout from the Second Boer War to understand the complex web of attitudes and experiences that underpinned the period in question; indeed to understand England's cultural identity. The work of David Bell on "total war" and the changing nature of warfare and identity in war will provide an original framework to the ideas under discussion. Primary evidence will ascertain if to the citizens and soldiers of England Germany became not only the enemy in wartime, but the "other," a society opposed to everything they held dear.

Introduction

Chapter One - "Total War" and the Nature of Warfare: Opponent to Enemy?

Chapter Two - England and Identity: the Cultural Context

Chapter Three - English Citizens and the "other"

Chapter Four - Soldiers and the "other"

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

The road to the First World War is a many travelled one, with generations of historians trying to understand and pinpoint what events and occurrences account for war breaking out in the summer of 1914. The fusion of events and political wrangling that took place in the early twentieth century will never cease to be of interest and continues to be raked through. The launch of the journal First World War Studies in 2010 attests to this. The Editor himself notes this in the inaugural issue, hoping that the journal "....will contribute significantly to the ongoing, and it can be argued accelerating, debates concerning the origins and causes, conduct and prosecution, and consequences, repercussions, and legacy of the First World War." [1] However, this work seeks to move away from this area and look instead at England itself, its cultural identity and a supposed shift in the nature of warfare. To see if to its citizens and soldiers Germany and Germans did over time become an "other" in opposition to themselves; an opponent in direct contrast to English national and racial identity, the antithesis to her values and ideals.

The source of the concept of the "other," the society of the time and the practice of war itself will be looked at in depth, to examine if the idea of Germany as an evil enemy was built up by newspapers and government. To see, in particular, if they moved away from the status of an honourable adversary to something more complex and dangerous. How did the demonization of Germany occur? Did an idea of Germany as an evil race to be crushed ever go beyond the fantasies of a small section of writers and journalists' to be embraced by the public at large? Did the rhetoric of the state encourage such a view or did it provide a more balanced picture of the enemy? The shift from opponent to enemy, which David Bell in his book on "total war" argues happened first in the Napoleonic period, will be analysed in the twentieth century in relation to England and Germany.[2] Though this explores another, more extreme, idea of the enemy, the very events that occurred in the Napoleonic period are ones that can be seen to be mirrored on the run up to the First World War and this creates a new angle with which to view the period.

When researching the First World War the individual voice has been dwarfed by the overriding image of a society geared up for war, welcoming it if not desiring it and ready to defeat a dangerous adversary. Of a hunger for war that went beyond adventure stories and imperialist enthusiasm. The bold, striking images of the propaganda posters of the evil 'Hun' have long lived on in the imagination, encapsulating not men but a savage representation of an enemy who must be faced and stopped.[3] Is this a true representation of the feelings of English citizens and soldiers or was the idea of Germany as the enemy proper something that was never created and accepted? At times, an alarmingly sweeping generalisation is still employed by historians in order to discuss the atmosphere of the time and the feelings encountered towards Germany. This is demonstrated in works such as Robin Andersen's A Century of Media, A Century of War, which shows just how skewed modern perceptions can still be. In this the argument is that modern rhetoric, especially by America, is harking back to the era of the First World War and the simplistic divide between good and evil. This is the same idea that can be seen to be forwarded by both Said and Bell, however Andersen's interpretation is ominously narrow.[4] Not only did the First World War apparently invent this kind of language but it succeeded in "...nurturing a public hysteria so visceral it could justify the slaughter."[5] George Robb similarly condemns the entire English society of the time. He paints the picture of an England unbalanced by the "..extreme rhetoric of nationalism.." and claims that "..British society became saturated with Germanophobia."[6] There is no nuanced analysis and no attempt to provide a balance picture. Though there is no denying that atrocity propaganda was used and that there were reprisals against German citizens in England, through cases of rioting and the government system of interning them, it does not however mean that it was widespread. This is what this work will be attempting to uncover, through analysing the society of 1900 England alongside primary source evidence. Did the idea of Germany as all out adversary to be annihilated ever reach down to the man and woman in the street and in to the hearts and the minds of the soldiers themselves?

This does not seek to claim, however, that there are not other historians who are trying to redress the balance and uncover the truth beyond the myths of the period. Adrian Gregory's book The Last Great War provides an unflinchingly critical look at the period and is able to acknowledge where conclusions cannot be drawn.[7] It is merely to suggest that in our understanding of the relationship between England and Germany, particularly in the early stages of the war and its run up, there is a tendency to colour events based on the benefit of hindsight. To read in an "othering" that may never have been there for the majority of the population. Through examining the build up to war and then through 1914 to 1915, this work will be able to, through the unique slant of Bell's theories, show if a deliberate policy of "othering" was pursued. It will be able to assess if it was built up over time and if it was indeed successful. It will therefore also attempt to determine if this vision of the enemy as an "other" was now an integral part of the altered landscape of war.

Chapter One - "Total War" and the Nature of Warfare: Opponent to Enemy?

The "self" and identity are integral to the concept of the "other;" only through first defining yourself and what you stand for can you then construct the "other," the opposition to your beliefs and values. Identity is also integral to the experience of war.[8] There then occurs the progression of the expansion of the self to the collective identity of a nation; one defined by its ethnicity, culture, education and values, among others.[9] Nationalism is seen as a modern phenomenon, something created out of the Napoleonic wars and the rise of the cult of France and Napoleon.[10] Such related belief in her superior right to lead and conquer can be seen in many strands of discourse in England in the late nineteenth century.[11] This is until the experience of the Second Boer War and the confusion of defeat undermined the confidence that had been built over the years and showed that warfare itself was changing; England would have to adapt in order to survive.[12] The Boers were, to English society at that time, the "other" in many ways. This can be seen in the belief that a war against them would be won easily, as befitting a superior nation against an inferior one, the perception of them as combatants, the behaviour towards them in wartime and the use of 'concentration camps.' All underline how they had been set up, to some, as a race in contrast to everything England stood for.[13] Such attitudes came from the racial, biological identity England was forming as part of the experience of the times, potentially moving the goal posts on how the enemy would be viewed in the future.

It is important, firstly, to understand the concept of the "other" and how it has evolved. The term's origin can be traced back to the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and his book Phenomenology of Mind published in 1807.[14] In it he explores the idea of the "consciousness of self."[15] Through looking in depth at the individual and the "self," forming a work in the words of J.B. Baillie "..of such originality and profound insight into the operations of the human spirit..," he created the idea of the "other" and "otherness."[16] For Hegel the "self" is only realised and created through an "other" and in opposition to this "other."[17] As Baillie underlines in the introduction to chapter IV, Hegel determines "....the fuller sense of self obtained when the self is aware of itself in relation to another self."[18] Therefore opposition is the key word, not necessarily of conflict but of forming an image of "self" and identity through a contrasting image. Just as with Jacques Lacan's theory of the mirror-stage and the way in which "...perceptions of the self are structured according to an external image."[19] Though criticised by some for not developing the philosophical debate of the "self" further, Hegel had conjured up a phrase and a concept of great power, still used and debated, that has been taken on by many in an attempt to describe the enemy.[20] Hegel's interest in a historical context and the stages of "..the development of the human race...," means that he understood that ideas on the "self" and identity could be applied to different historical points in time.

The definition of "self" as part of a philosophical battleground has been around since René Descartes, seen as the father of modern philosophy, because he established "...the modern philosophical obsession with the self as the locus and arbiter of knowledge...."[21] This was then developed in turn by the philosophers of each new generation, however they encouraged a limited view based on their own experiences, a purely Western, European one. This compounded "..the ignorance or lack of appreciation of alternative cultures and states of mind."[22] They were firmly rooted in the culture and attitudes of their time. For Anthony Elliott society forms the "backdrop" of the process of forming identity.[23] Through this he goes on to discuss the idea of collective identity and nationalist identities, but for him they are "..forms of identity which are not based on the self...."[24] This is interesting as only through forming your "self" can you then position yourself within a group identity of shared values. To take yourself out of the culture of your time and of the, "Social practices, cultural conventions, and political relations....." is difficult to achieve.[25] With the interplay with the outside world and society, it is easy therefore to see why the idea of the "self" has been scrutinised so closely and approached from so many disciplines.[26]

Contemporary observers used the idea of identity and the "other" to develop the field of philosophy and contribute to "...the whole of reality that makes full rational sense..."[27] However the ideas of identity and the "other" have been developed in different ways over time to describe the enemy and practices during wartime. It has also been embraced as a term for modern observers to look back on historical events and take a critical perspective on nationalism and the opposition between races and societies. This leads on to where the idea of the "other" becomes particularly interesting. If your sense of "self" is indeed created through an "other, " i.e. I am good so you are bad, I am strong so you are weak, I am civilised, so you are un-civilised, then how does "othering" work at a national level? Said tackles this in his work Orientalism, originally published in 1978, in which he sets out his ideas on ethnic "othering" and how the Orient, in opposition to Europe, forms "...one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other."[28] We see the progression of Hegel's concept in his book, taken to a national level, as he mostly discusses the impact of British and French opposition which has in more recent years been taken up by America. "In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience."[29] He talks of power and domination citing as very influential the ideas of Michel Foucault and of the way the Orient was managed and produced by Europe.[30] The idea of European identity as superior to that of non-Europeans is vital and Said argues that "...European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as sort of a surrogate and even underground self."[31] Hegel himself "..mentions the Orient only to dismiss it for its 'arbitrariness, savagery, and dimness of passion.'"[32] Said has formed therefore what was, and still is, a controversial viewpoint on the "other" and the way in which power, control and domination go hand in hand with ethnic "othering."[33]
As Rana Kabbani states, "...one dominant group become able to forge images of the 'alien' by imposing its own self-perpetuating categories and deviations from the norm."[34] Here then we clearly can see the discussion of opposition and the "self" as crucial in terms of a collective identity that Elliott dismissed. However, of course, Said is talking about Europeans and non-Europeans, white people versus those of other colours. So what type of "othering" was achieved for the German nation, if at all? Was a country viewed generally as on the same cultural and intellectual scale as England turned into the "other" on the run up to the First World War?[35] Said puts much emphasis on the discourses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in relation to "othering" and how ideas of social Darwinism, the progress of civilisation and race theory had "..very wide circulation..."[36] It is a time period that Said continually refers back to throughout the book, even starting off chapter one with a speech given by Balfour in 1910 that for him underlines this assessment. Though the amount to which such theories and debates were actually embraced by the population of England and how much they shaped cultural identity will be addressed in chapter two, it is important to mention them here in terms of the significance Said attaches to them.[37] For him "othering" merges with nationalism and imperialism and is the root of much of the modern evils in society, with the language of the "other" now being directed by America against the Middle East.[38]

Though Said's work is focused around the concept of the "other," at no stage does he make an attempt to define what he means by the "other" or look at its historiography. It is as if, as with other authors looking at well analysed concepts such as "total war," he believes there is no need for explanation.[39] This is unfortunate, yet he does leave us with a quote that has much similarity to Hegel's analysis, that repairs much of the damage.

My way of doing this has been to show that the development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another different and competing alter ego. The construction of identity...involves establishing opposites and "others" whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from "us". Each age and society re-creates its "Others". Far from a static thing then, identity of self or of "other" is a much worked-over historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a context involving individuals and societies."[40]

Just as with Hegel, he very firmly had a view of a historical line, where each society creates an "other" in opposition to itself and where the "other" is a necessary component. C. Ernest Dawn, reviewing the book soon after publication, praised Said's links to modern day thinking and "othering" but is critical of his lack of historical understanding and imperialism in general. "Unfortunately....reiterated vague references to 'imperialism' constitute the totality of historical analysis."[41] However, this does not detract from Said's analysis of the "other," which will be used as the overall definition of "othering" going forward. Said's work on Orientalism continues to be debated and is still relevant in a modern context, as can be seen in Maryam Khalid's article linking Said's concept of the "other" to the present day and the War on Terror.[42]

However, it is important to highlight that different versions of the "other" evolved during the twentieth century. Said's concept is not one that is used with war or conflict in mind but rather to describe a conflicting "other" who can become an enemy through this opposition; who is set up as dangerous through providing a contrast to the society in question. Other concepts of the "other" are directly linked to war. Carl Schmitt, a former integral Nazi party member and jurist, wrote The Theory of the Partisan which evolved from two lectures delivered in 1962.[43] In it he proposed the concept of "absolute enmity."[44] He concludes that such warfare appeared out of the Napoleonic period in which "..new concepts of warfare were developed along with a new doctrine of war and politics."[45] Though this brought a new style of warfare he does make the distinction between combatants in uniform and the true partisan, those without. For him the First World War was conducted upon the established codes of traditional warfare, where the partisan was a "marginal figure."[46] He is then looking further into the twentieth century, in particular to the war he experienced so intimately and after, for true examples of such enmity.

Schmitt references directly back to the work On War by Carl von Clausewitz as the source of his inspiration.[47] This is a hugely influential text as it is widely attributed to be the birthplace of the thoughts and ideas associated with "total war."[48] Clausewitz fought in the Prussian army against Napoleonic France and he wrote the book in response to seeing "the immense destructive power of the French armies."[49] In it he first espoused the theory of "absolute war."[50] It is easy to see why Schmitt would be such an admirer of his work. It is interesting however that he directly credits his own theory to studying the notes Lenin produced from reading On War in 1915. "...in the age of revolution the distinction between friend and enemy is the primary distinction, decisive for war as for politics. Only revolutionary war is true war for Lenin, because it derives from absolute enmity. Everything else is a conventional game."[51] This theory of the "other" then for Schmitt is one that decisively came out of the Napoleonic period and, as Bell sums it up, describes "..a condition in which each side denies the very humanity of the other."[52]

Schmitt's work is fundamental to the work of Bell on "total war" in the Napoleonic period, as he argues "absolute enmity" took place during this period as part of the first occurrence of "total war."[53] The phrase "total war" is generally agreed to have appeared at the end of the First World War.[54] It is a "notoriously slippery" concept, as the definition changes with each historian, but broadly speaking it has a range of circumstances that dictate that the economy and manpower of a nation is invested almost completely in waging war.[55] The blurring of the line between civilian and soldier is also seen as an integral part. This is why it is continually linked to the twentieth century, as there was a scale of societal involvement and economic production for war that had not been seen before. Bell is very clear from the outset that his definition of "total war" focuses on the culture of the time, the language of violence and the "political dynamic" involved.[56] Through Bell this seemingly twentieth century phenomenon is thoroughly and convincingly uprooted.

As previously mentioned, in terms of war, identity and nationalism become a focus from around 1800 onwards.[57] Bell argues that this period, through looking at the experiences of France in particular, produced a "culture of war," whose effects followed a linear strand and caused ramifications that can be seen in the present day.[58] Said also references the Napoleonic era and Napoleon in particular and discusses the changes that occurred during this time that have affected modern society.[59] War was used in an attempt to bring the country together and to demonstrate the superiority of France's new liberty and principles and their new found nationalism.[60] The revolution and subsequent political changes in turn lead to a new language of war, with the enemy as "moral monsters" to be wiped out and where war itself was glorified as an experience through which the individual and France itself could find redemption.[61] Bell invests his time in recreating the atmosphere of the period and the building of pressure and intensity of the rise of militarism, of the rhetoric of peace and redemption, of the need for greater measures for total victory. A society was created where the military was set up to be idealised and admired by all.[62] War was no longer a "theatre of the aristocracy," but set apart from the normal social order.[63] All these elements can be seen, in varying degrees, in the period on the run up to the First World War which is why his work provides an interesting base from which to scrutinise the period. Although, it must be made clear that Bell's view of the "other" is based on Schmitt's work and is a world away from the concept of the "other" forwarded by Said.

Vilho Harle's work continues this strand of the "other" debate down the "absolute enmity" path, suggesting that there is always an "other" but that the "other" is not always an enemy.[64] The concept of enemy that he goes on to discuss is therefore a "special case" of the "other," with the "other" being an important construct.[65] "A sense of otherness is definitely required for self-identity: just as one cannot know what large means without a sense of the small, one cannot comprehend himself fully if he has no appreciation of who and what he is not."[66] Harle's article leans heavily on the work of James A. Aho and it is hard to establish where he has added his own interpretation. The ideas on the enemy are taken from Ofer Zur, who defines two distinct types. "The worthy enemy is an equal partner in a (ritualistic) war or in a friendly contest.....We can have nothing in common with the evil enemy. We must destroy him......"[67] Here, clearly, we can see where it strays into the territory of Schmitt's work on "total enmity." Harle directly references Schmitt, but it is for his book The Concept of the Political, a work also referenced by Bell.[68] In this Schmitt discusses the "political grouping of friend and enemy" and of the political motives behind war.[69] As Tracy B. Strong underlines, "It is not my enemy but our enemy; that is "enemy" is a political concept."[70] We can see therefore why this would be of interest to Harle as a Professor of International Relations. The article is couched from this perspective, with relations in Europe in terms of enemy and "other" being hastily discussed at the end. This vastly deviates from the work of Said from a created "other" in opposition to an enemy who must be annihilated at all costs.

In the introduction to Creating The Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe, Nancy M. Wingfield, though taking much of her definition of the "other" from Harle, does look at it from an ethnic and national perspective. She does therefore ally herself with the work of Said.[71] "Historians and other social scientists interested in the construction of national identity have increasingly employed the term, "Other," applying it in connection with the identity-building process."[72] Though her ultimate analysis is at odd's with Said's, it is useful to see that there is a solid base of work on the "other" and its link to identity and through that the "self." Harle himself went on to write a book on the "other" in Western political thought and the concept has even deviated into the business world and been used to define the message of theme parks.[73]
Returning to Bell's work there is much emphasis placed on the change in the nature of warfare and the shift in attitudes that took place, where a once honourable adversary on the battlefield became an enemy who must be destroyed at all costs.[74] How then had the practices of war changed from the Napoleonic period prior to 1900? Had this shift really taken place? Robert M. Epstein makes it clear that Napoleon introduced a new type and scale of warfare that outclassed his European opponents until they were able to respond and match his tactics.[75] As the length of battles increased so did the amount of firepower needed.[76] "Victory was a product of successive battles and engagements. The armies were so big that a battle now took days to fight."[77] During the American Civil War came advances in communication and support from behind the scenes due to the railroads and the telegraph. This war also show the deadly side of trench warfare, where "...the tactical combination of rifles and trenches produced battlefield deadlock."[78] For Epstein and also Geoffrey Wawro, warfare remained along the lines of that fought in Napoleonic times until after the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian war, where armies became larger and technology advanced again.[79]

Technology had, in no uncertain terms, vastly changed the practice of war. "The rifled breech-loading weapons used in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) had ranges nearly ten times as great as the muskets and artillery of the Napoleonic wars."[80] This was exemplified by the invention of the Maxim machinegun in 1885.[81] Technology was the reason for the British defeats in the Second Boer War, as the British army had superior numbers of men but this did not help when their old tactics of warfare faced an onslaught of firepower.[82] The Boers retreated when necessary and forced the British troops to move further and further into their territory.[83] It cost Britain dearly in terms of men, money and prestige. "The Boer War....dragged on for three years..... It cost the British Empire as many lives as the Americans would lose in Vietnam many years later, and gave a frightening glimpse of the ways in which warfare had changed since 1870."[84] As Wawro states, "..in a typical mid-nineteenth century battle, the rate of dead and wounded had rarely exceeded 10 per cent of effectives engaged."[85]

The British troops resorted to the burning of farms and the rounding up of Boers in 'concentration camps,' which caused more deaths than the years of fighting. "It was a dirty end to a dirty war..."[86] This protracted struggle through Africa provided the last vision of war for England and the troops involved until the start of the First World War. Army observers, sent over from many countries to witness its undertaking, discussed the difficulty of men against machine and debated how the wars of the future would be fought.[87]

"No matter what the weapons might be, the citizens of the great industrial nations thought that future wars would continue to be like the limited and relatively humane engagements of the old days. New weapons and old ideas – that fatal combination would make nonsense of all their anticipations of coming wars."[88]

This chapter has demonstrated that the concept of the "other" has been developed over time far beyond Hegel's initial desire to understand further the intricacies of the "self" and identity. Though branching off into the realm of "absolute enmity," to construct the vision of the evil enemy that occurs in wartime, it is Said's vision of the "other" that will be debated regarding England and Germany in the period 1900-1915. His idea of ethnic "othering," of a sense of opposition and contrast, of "othering" taken to a national, and in his case European level, will provide an interesting and provocative framework with which to examine the relationship between the two countries.

Chapter Two - England and Identity: the Cultural Context

As discussed in the last chapter, identity is integral to Said's concept of the "other." In order to assess if an "othering" towards Germany and Germans did occur, the cultural identity of England circa 1900 needs to be examined. If in order to become the "other" to England, Germany needed to be viewed in opposition and as antithesis to England, then how did England and its citizens view itself? What was its national and racial identity and what part did nationalism play? Was England already, as this collective identity, contrasting itself against an enemy or an "other" and if so, how was this expressed?

Bernard Porter, through discussing the impact of imperialism in this era in Britain, calls the subject of British national identity a "vexed question" because it can be seen that ".. 'national identity' has very little to do with the realities of national life; in most cases it is an elite construction....."[89] Though of course difficult to assess it is important to use this chapter to try to analyse what the dominant discourses of the time were and how social Darwinism, the Second Boer War and the internal and external political climate helped shaped the way the citizens of England viewed themselves.[90] Through the work of Hilary and Dik Evans on science and disaster fiction in this period, we are painted a very vivid portrait of the average English citizen of 1900. For them the progress that had been made in the last "great" century assured the citizens of England that they could look forward with "high hopes."[91] Here progress is the key word, a belief in the time, that "..all things were manifestly improving..." leading to a "..non-stop discourse.." on the subject.[92] An inherited Victorian view of a "..ladder of progress.," up which all nations were trying to advance; civilised nations like Britain being, of course, located very near the top.[93] However, for David Powell, though this view of Britain had been dominant in the mid nineteenth century, by the time of Victoria's death in 1901 it was waning.[94] This was a time of considerable upheaval and serious doubts had been raised by England's experience and performance during the Second Boer War. There was a feeling that an impending power struggle was on the horizon.[95]

Michael Howard in contrast makes it clear that the belief in the dominance of Britain as a world leader, destined to progress and grow, was a firmly established doctrine.[96] He is critical of historians who "underestimate and mock," without fully appreciating the cultural context.[97] The apparently ingrained attitude of superiority over other races comes, for him, as a fundamental part of the governance of Empire. [98] His are very clear cut assertions, with no real evidence to back up claims that such beliefs had filtered down the all levels of English society. According to Ronald Hyam, this attitude towards imperial subjects had been cemented in the nineteenth century. Industrialisation had propelled Britain ahead of other regions of the world and inspired a "British cultural arrogance...and a desire to 'improve' other peoples...."[99] Governing people in the Empire was in itself just a form of "enlightened despotism," with the citizens of England being generally unaware of any atrocities.[100] As Robb points out, "...Britain's dependent colonies seldom benefitted from its democratic traditions."[101] Here then is Porter's "elite construction," with the rich and powerful, allowed to exercise authority; an "othering" along the lines of Said's Orientalism. This extended to the political elite as such thinking on a "hierarchy" of races was still "...enshrined as a Liberal party doctrine in 1900."[102] This still does not, as yet, encompass the majority of the English population. However, it is important to point out that Hyam is explicitly looking for instances of imperialism and the aggressive attitudes that went along with it, not assessing the general culture of the time without this reference point. It does, nonetheless, provide a useful starting point with which to look further at the underlying attitudes and opinions of England.

In trying to uncover how the identity of England shaped itself in response to an "other," it is worthwhile to look closer at these attitudes towards other races. Hyam concludes that there had been a widespread deterioration of attitudes to other races in Britain due, unsurprisingly, to imperialism and the publication of Charles Darwin's Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection in 1859.[103] Darwin's work created order out of nature and could be seen to fit nicely in to the views of the time on competition, progress and hierarchy.[104] Howard clearly sums up the reason why it created such a stir; here was a scientific reason for England's position of superiority in the world.[105] Hilary and Dik Evans argue that the inability of the masses to understand science led to mass, docile acceptance of ideas such as social Darwinism.[106] However, for Alfred Kelly, this limited understanding was a key to its success and wide dissemination.[107] Hyam is quick to point out that Darwin's ideas on race were distorted by others, yet he clearly suggests that it was embraced by the political establishment.[108] For Zara S. Steiner and Keith Neilson, social Darwinism "..coloured the 'official mind'.." but was not as yet an established "...intellectual influence."[109] Wilfried Fest is clear that a certain racial attitude towards the Boers was not an accepted view for everyone, calling it a "...typical middle-class phenomenon as reflected in various pseudo-scientific pamphlets of the time."[110] This is also voiced by Brad Beaven in his work on local patriotism and imperialism during the Second Boer War. Rex Pope underlines the fact that enthusiasm for the war was strongest among the middle classes.[111] There was also widespread condemnation of some of the practices of the war, internationally as well as at home, due to the large amount women and children that had died in the camps alongside the men.[112] Yet, however, we also have the view of an outright lust for war. "..traditional Liberals and pacifists were appalled at popular sentiment in Britain during the Boer War...."[113] Through this we must conclude that even if there was enthusiasm for the war and excitement in the prospect of further Empire expansion for England and a belief in the superiority of the "white man," it did not necessarily translate to a widespread view of the Boers as the "other." It is therefore important at this point to consider further media evidence from the time.[114]

An article in the Hampshire Telegraph and Naval Chronicle in 1900 compliments the Boers as fighters, against Englishmen, by calling them "...foemen worthy of their steel."[115] However it could be seen to be praising the Boers in order to explain why they were proving such a surprisingly robust test of the British army. James Caldwell, writing in to The Standard, puts it down to "..the supernatural strength, which patriotism arouses, that enables small nationalities to hold their own...."[116] He is giving the Boers the same rights as the men of any other country under threat and again there is an indication of respect for their fighting abilities so far. An article at the end of that year discusses the farm burning policy and the declaration by Lord Roberts that these measures ".... were strictly in accordance with the usages of civilised warfare."[117] This is perhaps to show the contrast to the Boers distinctly uncivilised modes of fighting. The blame for the women and children being brought into the camps is placed firmly on the Boer leaders themselves.[118] It is perhaps telling that in Chamberlain's controversial speech in Edinburgh at the end of 1901, in terms of future actions against the Boers, he is clearly, openly, not ruling anything out.[119] If war at this time was still conducted along civilised lines, as claimed earlier, then this speech suggests that towards the Boers there was a different view of the enemy entirely influenced by the racist attitudes of the age.[120] This range of sources however mixes the political elite view with that of the ordinary citizen and it appears that between them there was quite a gulf of opinion. Though ethnic "othering" did occur, due to the practices meted out to the Boers by those in charge, there is no strong indication to suggest that it filtered down to society as a whole. However, fighting them as an enemy underlined that England was not as secure in her power as she once was.[121] This created troubling questions on her capacity to fight in wartime and on the future enemies she would have to face.

How much did the failures of the Second Boer War help develop English national identity and feed into a sense of nationalism? The interest in "military might," increasing since the second half of the nineteenth century, tied in with internal fears of England's ability to defend herself.[122] Through newspaper coverage and an interest in England's strength as a nation, "War had become the concern of all citizens."[123] England sought to repair her international standing and self image and through this looked towards the future and who the next threat might be.[124] There was an increasingly held belief that a war was coming with Germany and a fear that ".....if the British military capacity could be stretched to breaking point by the Boers, how could it cope with the Germans...?"[125] The military and militarisation of society became of everyday interest and concern as shown by the Education Bill of 1902, the increase of rifle associations and the scout movement led by Sir Robert Baden-Powell.[126] Anne Summers suggests that The National Service League was formed out of the embarrassment of the Boer Wars.[127] This led to a development of a "cult of games and manliness," where children, the generation who would go on to fight in the First World War, were brought up in part on great military adventures.[128] However, as Paul M. Kennedy points out, "Such activities are hard to separate from the general overtones of patriotism and duty which were inculcated in Victorian and Edwardian society."[129] For Kennedy, any real impact of nationalism would have been felt among the middle classes, who made up the membership of the patriotic leagues, whose children attended the scouts and who made up the majority of the readership of adventure and invasion novels.[130]

Howard argues that by no means did such militarism filter down, or was the army widely accepted, until the outbreak of war and that this was "... a matter of repeated complaint."[131] Paul Crook emphasises that talk of competition and militarism was by no means a dominant discourse, as alongside evidence of such language is also that of peace and harmony.[132] For him a myth has arisen around the run up to the First World War in which the evidence of the strength of Darwin has been exaggerated, as post-war Historians were looking for evidence of "... explanations of war and empire based upon sinister interests, conspiracy theory and sheer atavism."[133] Though Chamberlain is now seen as one of the "Darwinian jingoists" he is just, according to Crook, a champion of empire, growth and nationalism; a product of his time.[134] There are, of course, links between social Darwinism, militarism and race, but Crook is arguing for a more rigorous testing before they are so broadly applied to the period.[135] The rise of nationalism and militarism was noted and rallied against by contemporaries, seen in the growth of peace movements and attempts of organisations to foster better Anglo-German relations.[136] This rise did not lead however to widespread acceptance of an England defined by her military might.

The increasing debate surrounding the fitness of men for war and gathering concern over social issues and state involvement in the day to day lives of civilians, tied in with the movement of Eugenics.[137] This was in most cases directed against the working classes, seen by many as an almost internal "other."[138] Though attitudes were changing around 1900, poverty had previously been seen as resulting from "defects of individual character." Summer rubbishes the idea that concerns over "racial degeneration" voiced through Eugenics was ever applied broadly to society, in military terms, as it would have excluded sections of the population who would have been needed to boost the army.[139] There is also the consideration that politicians would have been careful not to alienate the working classes.[140] Powell, commenting on the work of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, agrees that they rejected the more "alarmist visions of degeneracy and racial decline" and concentrated instead of making recommendations for tackling poverty and health issues.[141] Again this links in with the change in attitudes at that time towards the responsibility of the state over social concerns. However, Frank Dikötter argues that Eugenics was very much a part of citizens' day to day lives through fears of a declining birth rate [142] Robb moves from saying that it was a concern of many citizens to claiming it was a topic of discussion only among intellectuals.[143] Even if of interest and debate to the citizens of England, this did not mean, however, that it was accepted without resistance. Leading scientists in Britain "...denounced the race and class prejudice it cultivated" and strong reactions in Germany and France pushed it to the margins.[144] Though there were fears over the decay of the state and of England's strength to fight, heightened by the anxiety of a future war, it appears such concerns never dominated the political stage and remained a fixation for the few.[145]

It is crucial to highlight that the internal and international political situation was in flux in the early 1900's. A Conservative victory in 1900, seen by Fest as a result of "..farming nationalist emotions in elections....." was swept aside by a massive, crushing victory for the Liberals in 1906.[146] This was an apparent sign that the country was disillusioned with recent events in South Africa and was demanding a change of direction.[147] A flurry of agreements and alliances from the period 1902-7, seen by some as a sign of hostility towards Germany, was evidence of England "...sacrificing affairs of global independence for a measure of national security."[148] At many times the governing elite were "seriously divided" on the policy towards other countries and who should be viewed as a threat and who as an ally and it was a time of great international upheaval.[149] The role of nationalism during this time is a question of intense debate between historians, as it figures in the story of all the main players on the run up to the First World War.[150] Powell calls nationalism "...central to the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century British experience."[151] Summers argues that "... Jingoism was a defensive reaction to a perceived external threat..."[152] This would suggest that England was not overly militaristic or attempting to create an "other" out of Germany. This is in complete contrast to Robb who attests that, "Nationalism attempted to focus conflict outward..."[153] As with Summers, Powell aligns it to "concern over Britain's national defence" and again with the growing threat seen to be coming from Germany, especially in terms of her naval expansion.[154]

As previously discussed, nationalism is seen as a modern construction, as prior to the rise of France and Napoleon sentiments of association and inclusion were "..focused on a particular town or region rather than on an entire nation." For Oliver Zimmer, though nationalism had featured on the political agenda before the end of the nineteenth century, it was from 1890 onwards that it became a "mass phenomenon."[156] This means it went from a concern of primarily the middles classes to a concern for all. L.L. Farrar, Jr.'s explanation is rather more dramatic. "Nationalism and the war are in fact bound together like Siamese twins...a relationship which is fundamental to our explanation of the period."[157] However, it in his rushed, sweeping analysis is not made clear whether it is fundamental for England. Kennedy finds "radical nationalism" not only within the media, in England and Germany during this time, but also in the patriotic leagues.[158] For Robb, "...nationalism and race greatly influenced the course of the war..." For him each country, through war, became aware of their own racial and national identity and through that formed an enemy who was believed to be inferior in all respects.[159] This is Said's concept of the "other" brought to bear on the First World War. For Robb there is no question that in England Germany became an "other." In terms of nationalism it is clear that it is intricately linked in with the period but its expression in England can be looked at by further exploring the part of the invasion story.

Through the work of I.F. Clarke on "future war" stories, we can see how this sense of nationalism was played out through invasion literature. Such stories helped to shape the idea of Germany as the enemy and could adapt to and reflect the changing political circumstances of the time; even forcing two Prime Ministers' to speak out about the hysteria they were creating.[160] This means that such narratives had a real power and suggests that the anticipation of a coming war was very much in the public eye. According to Clarke, everything can be traced back to the publication of George Tomkyns Chesney's story The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer, first published in May 1871.[161] It was "..the first tale of the future to attract immediate attention throughout the world."[162] It was bitingly critical of British organisation and defence and involved a man looking back with regret at the invasion of Britain. [163] Most importantly it featured the enemy, for the first time, as the Germans rather than the French; the French however would continue to feature as the traditional enemy until 1903.[164] The success of Germany in the War of 1870 had fuelled the story and fed into a "national nervousness" about Germany's placing on the world stage and her future military expectations; a "constant theme" of invasion literature at that time according to Howard.[165] Summers however warns of taking this at face value. "The number and frequency of invasion scares in the Edwardian period seem barely credible to us today, and some contemporaries were also highly suspicious of them."[166]

Even if at times utterly damning, their success was due to the fact that everyone was in it together to defend England, the ordinary citizen could taste glory and action alongside the sailor or solider.[167] The late nineteenth century was the "great age of reading..." and such stories therefore combined with the growth of the illustrated magazine and the rise of education and literacy in general.[168] They formed part of the makeup of popular culture at the time and indicate that war and the idea of a future war was big business. This is evident through the new type of journalism that had arrived in the 1890's and the way the Second Boer War had become a media war. News on battles and letters from the front involved the country in a way that had never happened before.[169] However, Beaven is arguing that this led to a strengthening of local ties, rather than national unity. As Said states in Culture and Imperialism, "The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important......"[170] This ties in with the fact that as time went on the narrative became one of only one overriding enemy and real threat; Germany. I will be discussing in the final chapters, through analysis of the citizens, soldiers and media of the time, if this was mirrored in day to day society or was simply the work of fiction to entertain.

So how was Germany viewed at the start of the new century? Was she discussed in equal terms to England or was there already an "othering" taking place? Karl Rohe believes that although Britain was respected she had been overtaken in the 1900's by Germany and had lost her "..intellectual leadership..."[171] For Rohe respect and animosity between the two countries were entwined. They were competing rivals, such jostling was part of the territory, but they did have a linking factor of "..racial solidarity..."[172] This idea of "..common bonds of race and religion..." is also echoed by Kennedy and Steiner and Neilson.[173] Peter Winzen argues for a more hostile situation. He suggests that Heinrich Gotthard von Treitschke's views of England as Germany's one true opponent shaped an entire generation between 1890 and 1914, as he argued for a distribution of maritime power away from this 'nation of shopkeepers.'[174] This however begs the question of how much these views filtered down the masses of Germany, but does suggest that at a political, governmental level, such views may well have set the scene for later naval policy.[175] For Steiner and Neilson the British and German interests were incompatible, in line with Rohe's argument, but they go further and argue that the breakdown of alliance talks created an "..ill will which affected both official and popular feeling."[176] Hyam argues that there was a sense of co-operation between the two powers, yet does point out that the major fear of England from 1898 onwards was due to Germany's naval programme and plans for expansion.[177] This was a relationship that was becoming distinctly unsettled but was still underpinned by a sense of shared heritage and respect.

This chapter has demonstrated that English collective identity was a very fluid concept. In terms of England setting itself against an enemy, or an "other," there are examples that the Boers to some extent encompassed that role at the beginning of the 1900's. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that such ethnic "othering" was more of a middle class concern, rather than that of English society as a whole. Germany and its citizens were no where near being seen as anything other than a respected, international rival. The collective identity of England was in flux at the beginning of the century. England was suffering from the after effects of the Second Boer War and the now dented belief in her superiority mixed in with a rise in the glorification of war and militarism, complex social problems and an increasingly tangled web of alliances between the great powers.[178] Who would provide the next opportunity for England to demonstrate her strength? The answer lay with Germany and the final chapters will demonstrate to what extent they became an "other" for its citizens and soldiers, in opposition to England, through her role as supposed aggressor and enemy. The political antagonism between the two countries is clearly documented but the vital question is whether this ever went beyond the clash of one nation pitted against another to something more.

Chapter Three - English Citizens and the "other"

This chapter will seek to explore whether the idea of Germany and the German people as the "other" actually filtered down to all levels of society. Using newspaper articles, alongside the history of events unfolding up to the end of 1915, it will attempt to show if a media "othering" was built up over time to create the "public hysteria" Andersen thinks was so evident.[179] Was this, to quote Robb, a society "saturated with Germanophobia"?[180] It will also be useful to look at occurrences of the internal "other." How did English citizens react to the idea of Germans living along side them, the alleged "Hidden Hand" of agents spreading over the country and trying to topple it from the inside?[181] The relationship between the England and Germany on the run up to the First World War has been thoroughly documented.[182] However, it is important to now look closely at the English media and propaganda, to see how Germany as the enemy were being portrayed and how this message was being received.

Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee call the First World War a "literary war."[183] This is evident not only from the start of the war, with the press involvement and the abundance of propaganda material, but also throughout the entire period from 1900 onwards. Hilary and Dik Evans put the responsibility for ramping up fear and tension squarely on to the shoulders of the journalists involved.[184] The newspapers and propagandists have the crime of inciting hatred continually laid at their door for sensationalising any incidents and fabricating atrocity stories between the two countries.[185] As Howard states, "One can by selective quotation...present an alarming picture of pre-1914 Britain as a proto-Fascist society, but in fact it was nothing of the kind....."[186] He makes the case that there were still the strong beliefs in Empire and superiority of Anglo-Saxon culture, but that it was shown "..without rancour or fanaticism..."[187] So what can an examination of the newspapers show us about the relationship with Germany before the war and how it changed?

As touched upon in the previous chapter, the relations between Germany and England had started to sour around the time of the Second Boer War with competition over Africa and at an international level.[188] In looking at The Times from 1900 there is certainly evidence of an unsettled, at times brittle, relationship.[189] Chamberlain's speech in 1901 underlined the battle of wills between them, but did not seek to damage relations as there was much mutual respect between the two nations.[190] From 1905 onwards, despite the continuing political entanglements, Germany is still discussed in neutral terms.[191] The disparity of opinion towards Germany can be shown in 1907 when in April the ex-minister of war for France is claiming in an article that "..the two Powers are absolutely destined to come to blows..." and in November a letter to the Editor on behalf of The National Council of British Peace Societies upholds the peaceful intentions between the two countries.[192] Papers, weeks or even days before war broke out, were still professing the idea that war could be avoided and Britain would not be involved; this is not the language of a country already hyped for war.[193] Relations up until the beginning of the war are permanently shifting.[194] The hostility over the navy question is countered by the 'Berlin-Baghdad' railway and the negotiations between the two countries that "..produced a very amicable settlement in 1914."[195]

Though it is true to say that there was evidence of "..paranoia and hysteria in the British press....," it mainly belonged to the sensationalist newspapers, for example the Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times. This paper provides wonderful accounts of inflammatory reporting.[196] In "Until the Autumn of 1911," an article about the date of the predicted war between England and Germany published in 1909, the picture of a shadowy, clawed soldier is seen looming out from Germany to extend its abominable reach to England.[197] However, at no point before 1914 did such reporting ever dominate.[198]

At the start of the war a letter to the Editor of The Times questions the wisdom of going to war against a "highly civilized" country such as Germany.[199] The author urges the country not to succumb to what he believes is "war madness."[200] On the same page is an article detailing the protests of a range of scholars, who believed if the war were to go ahead it would be a "..sin against civilization."[201] Though representative of an elite section of society, it does indicate the regard in which Germany was held and that excitement and lust for war did not emanate from all corners of England. In an article in The Times confirming war had been declared on the 4th August, no opinions on Germany are advanced and it highlights that two ministers resigned due to the decision.[202] Though of course there were those who welcomed the war and demonstrated enthusiasm for it, this shows implicitly that there were dissenting voices in English society.[203] Gregory doubts the idea of "war fever" and suggests that it was an idea spread by politicians in later years to focus the blame away from their substantial roles in the decision.[204] By the 11 August The Times is claiming that Germany has "..no friend in the civilized world." It states that her diplomats caused war through their own stupidity and floundering political activities.[205] Even in February 1915, Lord Sydenham is saying that the German people are "Brave, vigorous and patriotic..." but that essentially they have been led astray by their leaders.[206] There is no desire to "..crush the Germans..." or evidence of an opposition, a change in essential attitudes towards them.[207] This is very measured language run through with the belief in England being on the side of right and good. Yet this still is not the language of "othering."

So how were those in power expressing their views towards the Germans? Before 1901 Chamberlain and Kaiser Wilhelm had spoken of common ties of race, language and religion and Chamberlain had tried for an alliance in 1899.[208] Yet from 1901 onwards his feelings towards Germany, according to Steiner and Neilson, had soured.[209] They make it clear that Sir Edward Grey, who became Foreign Secretary in 1905, viewed Germany with great suspicion and as a danger to the country.[210] From 1907 onwards the attitude of the government and Foreign Office was constantly adapting to circumstances and opinions were divided on who was to be the major threat, Germany or Russia.[211] This was just a reflection of the fluidity of political relations at that time and that a war with Germany was not pre-ordained. Lloyd George's speech printed in The Times on the 22 July 1911 made it clear however that, though Britain was looking for peace, she was ready for action at any time.[212] This the language of political rivalry, of the understanding of a "'German challenge' which had to be countered'...."[213] Acknowledging a threat is not the same as inciting it, though Kennedy appears unable to make this distinction.

There is no notable shift once England was engaged in war. Asquith's Edinburgh speech reported on the 19 September makes it clear that Germany's recent culture had been focused on war and militarism.[214] Though this is an attack on their foreign policy it by no means sets them up as in opposition to England, or severs their common ground. Sir Edward Carson, the Attorney General, in a speech in August 1915 condemned the "aggression of Prussian domination" and talked of the "savagery and barbarism" of the opponent.[215] However it is coloured by the fact that he is actively trying to sway any neutrals to join in on England's side and this is in the light of recent events such as the sinking of the Lusitania and the use of poison gas. Lord Kitchener's statement in May 1915 on the war calls the use of gas a "..diabolical method of attack.."[216] Though again Germany or the Germans are not mentioned in any "othering" respect, this language must be framed in the context of the time. Words such as diabolical, beastly and frightful were deemed as the strongest language possible and were used to express a genuine horror of German tactics and of war itself.[217] England was in the midst of a bitter struggle and powerful language was needed to inspire and encourage, yet the attitude of those in charge suggests that the language of respect still outweighed anything else.

The fears over Germany's foreign policy and the intensions behind it were expressed through the navy race that occurred between the two countries on the run up to 1914. England's naval superiority was being threatened and they were determined to meet Tirpitz head on.[218] Though "Inflammatory articles..." appeared in various English publications from 1904-1905 it was from 1907 to 1909 that emotions in both countries became heightened.[219] This is due to navy budget discussions and the publication of an interview with Kaiser Wilhelm in October 1908 in which he was forthright over his country's plans and about the antagonism that existed towards England.[220] This accounted for English suspicion over Germany's reasons for their navy expansion, leading to increased interest over the prospect of a future conflict.[221] In 1909 "..intensely patriotic public opinion.." in Britain demanded an increase in battleship production to counter Germany's increasing numbers.[222] This was whipped up by The Navy League and the press, leading to the famous call for 'We Want Eight and We Won't Wait'."[223] Fears of invasion appeared to express themselves through the fear of naval expansion.[224] Admiral Fisher, First Sea Lord from 1904-1910, "..spoke out against the 'Hysteria Germanicus'.." and talks in early 1912 were conducted in Berlin, to try and come to some mutual arrangement, but failed.[225] Contemporary opinion did recognise such "..national excesses..." of public feeling.[226] Though the navy race was the subject of intense public interest and debate, it was simply evidence of a strong rivalry between the two countries. It cemented for England that Germany should be viewed with caution, but not, at this stage, with hostility.

Traditionally, propaganda and atrocity stories are seen as an integral part of the creation of a poisonous atmosphere towards Germany during the war. Though such stories are part of every war, as Lord Francis-Williams states, it was high circulation newspapers that gave them their prominence during the First World War.[227] It is widely documented now that many of the most shocking and notorious stories that appeared were a work of fiction.[228] There is no doubt that many acts of atrocity did occur, but to what extent did the real or imagined atrocities of the Germans encourage the English public to view them as an "other"?[229] The media, along with the propagandists, are held to account for ramping up tension in English society. Robb and Andersen, as intonated in the introduction, clearly believe that the British public were taken over by a hatred for Germany based on such stories, a real enmity, where the Germans were "..demonized beyond all recognition."[230] Not only this, Robb and Kevin Cramer suggest that this attitude was "cemented" from the very start of the war and a view of Germany as "..the savage "Hun," the jack-booted, spike-helmeted despoiler of innocent Belgium" was purposefully promoted.[231] Robb is adamant than an "othering" did occur, with England setting itself up as the moral crusader, Germany the "..antithesis of enlightenment and civilization."[232] He allows no room for any other reading of this time and is intent on lambasting England for its deluded hatred.

Propaganda was initially widely used for recruitment and to battle the tide of German propaganda to win over neutral countries like America. It was only over time that it became more sophisticated.[233] Pope blames the government for "stirring up nationalist fervour," helped by the papers, particularly those under the control of Lord Northcliffe.[234] This was not a blanket approach however and evidence shows that it was not always a "strongly anti-German line.." that was advanced.[235] However, whatever stories it ran criticising the official line, "..it continued to be regarded....as the official mouthpiece of the government."[236] Unlike propaganda, papers did advance a number of atrocity stories from the start of the war.[237] For Gregory "The Daily Mail was synonymous with Germanophobia...."[238] However, again, he points out that it was a much more balanced view than is first supposed and the paper was still capable of praising German behaviour in 1915.[239] There were also a large amount of Liberal papers and writers espousing the view of pacifism and providing an alternative view.[240]

We have become so used to the idea of the British press being full of images of Belgian babies impaled on bayonets, that it comes of something of a shock to actually read the British wartime press and to find that, whilst images of Hunnish barbarity are certainly not absent, they are in fact far less prominent than generally believed and that most of them are very different from those imagined [241]

Though 'Hun' was used as a "derogatory term," Gregory makes the case that in the Daily Mail, the word German appears more than 'Hun' in 1914 and that it is used in the context of the time to mean vandal.[242] This can be seen also in The Times, in an article condemning the destruction of Reims Cathedral.[243] In 1915 a French Commission of inquiry into German Atrocities created a report concluding that "...it is not an army of soldiers, but an army of butchers which is engaged."[244] This has to be looked at alongside various reports that prisoners of war were being treated, in most circumstances, extremely well; any "exaggeration" of brutality was cautioned against.[245] The events of 1915, with the sinking of the Lusitania and the use of poison gas for the first time, did create "..tremendous British hostility" and outbreaks of rioting occurred.[246] For Gregory, these events were instrumental in establishing ".. the image of Germany as having thrown aside civilised norms entirely."[247] The Medical Correspondent in The Times called it a "new German 'frightfulness'" and a "barbarous form of attack."[248] However, as Gregory points out, it was Germany and not the press who initiated this process, providing the "military acts" that created such outrage.[249] In 1915 The Times had a regular column that advanced the views in Germany on the war. This is not seeing them as an "other" but allowing them an outlet for their thoughts and opinions, not structuring them as an opponent with which there was no common ground.[250]
One way in which the attitude towards Germans and Germany displayed itself clearly after 1914 was through the fear of an internal threat through naturalised and un-naturalised Germans living in England.[251] The debate over aliens had been present many years before the war, an Aliens Act being passed in 1905. Seen as a response to the rise in feelings against Germans in the country, there is much to suggest it was actually an anti-Semitic, class-based measure.[252] Robb paints a horrific picture of a society gone mad with xenophobia, where all nationalities were attacked by mobs.[253] It is a damning indictment of English society, an attitude which he says reached from citizens, through sensationalist newspapers to MP's .[254] However, he contradicts himself by saying that there were a range of reactions from the papers, from horror to positive encouragement at such attacks, just as there would have been in society at the time.[255]

Robb perhaps looked too closely at the reporting of the Penny Illustrated Times, who as early as 1911 were asking "Is England Full of German Spies?"[256] In an Editorial from October 19 1914, The Times warns that "..the question of enemy aliens is rising to a flood.." and to "beware of every alien.[257] Though this is blatant scaremongering it also admits further down the article that the police have uncovered no mass conspiracy of "spy fever" and are detaining people in case they do something.[258] The paper takes a different tack on the 23 and proclaims that there is "...no evidence of...spy mania in this country," but they wish to encourage the government to take adequate steps.[259] In a letter to the Editor on the 29, a man voices the concern that a "..wedge of discord.." is being driven between British subjects due to proposed legislation.[260] This proves that even early on in the war there were people calling for a measure of calm. There is no denying there was rioting and attacks on Germans and other nationalities, that active internment of Germans occurred and that public figures with pro-German links were publicly harangued.[261] Each locality even had its own stories of alien intrigues and suspicions.[262] Such behaviour towards Germans is seen as a reaction against the events in 1915, yet in an article on the arrests of rioters in London, "The Lusitania was seldom, if ever, mentioned."[263] This does not appear to be a crazed mob rampaging London intent on wiping out and destroying everything German but one whipped up fear for their loved ones at the front, by the excitement of the moment and by a bread shortage.[264] Though only indicating the reasons behind the London riots, it could be seen as an indicator that many of the other instances of rioting and looting across the country had other reasons behind them than the assumed blind hatred.

H.G. Wells, in May that year, passionately argued for a stop to the "blood feud" between the British and the German people.[265] The war, for Wells, was not with the German people but its government and it is surely a distinction that many would have made.[266] As Z.A.B. Zeman states "....the lives of many innocent people were ruined by the promotion of this indiscriminate spy-hysteria which had virtually no basis in reality."[267] Gregory suggests that England turned in on itself as a result of the "..strains of war..."[268] He believes that such sentiment was a product of the war and not its cause.[269] Though it is clear that the citizens of England were alarmed about "..a sinister element in our midst.." and did react violently to German acts of war, the evidence provided in this chapter confirms that it was not widespread.[270] Throughout the war the authorities and the newspapers provided a balanced view of Germany and the citizens themselves provided an array of opinions regarding their opponent. The culture of hatred that is, even now, assumed to have had English society in its grip before and during the First World War, falters and breaks down under more intense scrutiny.

Chapter Four - Soldiers and the "other"

Having spent the last chapter considering the view of Germany as the "other" in English society and the amount to which the media contributed or even helped to form it, it is now important to turn to the opinions of the soldiers themselves. These were the men tasked with facing the enemy, with fighting them and witnessing first hand their actions and capabilities. How did the soldiers feel towards the Germans they were fighting? Is there a discernable shift in attitudes from 1914 to 1915? These are the questions this chapter, through an examination of letters and diaries, will be attempting to answer. Schmitt described the First World War as having retained the distinctions between combatants and non-combatants and where respect between adversaries remained, following the code of warfare laid out at the Congress of Vienna in the early nineteenth century.[271] Did the English soldiers have this respect for their opponent or did they see them as in contrast to their ideals and values? It is widely documented that all sides believed the war would be a short one, over in a matter of months and yet it continued to drag on in the face of greater and greater losses of men.[272] Did the view of the Germans worsen as time went on, friends were killed and new methods of warfare, such as poison gas, were encountered?

W.T. Colyer, on hearing the news of the declaration of war against Germany on the 5 August 1914, was eager to get into the fight and defend England. "Would they invade us, I wondered...My bosom swelled and I clenched my fist."[273] Colyer had eagerly read William Le Queux's invasion story years earlier and had been disappointed when a war never materialised.[274] For Private George Morgan it was simple, "..Germany was the aggressor and we wanted to show the Germans what we could do."[275] In what Malcolm Brown calls the "..heady atmosphere...." and "..joyous, crusading mood.." of the start of the war, the reasons for men joining up were varied and of course some would have been stirred into action by national or local patriotism.[276] However, for many it was the opportunity to experience adventure, escape "slum life" and get away from the confines of an uninspiring job, rather than any desire to face the enemy.[277] Private F.B. Vaughan talks of a "cumulative" effect of various pressures that lead to him joining up.[278] The speech that the Prime Minister, Asquith, made to the House of Commons on the 7 August 1914 shows that this was a war being promoted as one of principles and not aggression.[279] Germany was not set up as an "other" from the start of the war and therefore such sentiments did not initially filter down to the men.

As Pope notes, "At the outbreak of war, the British army had a regimental strength of less than a quarter of a million men."[280] He goes on to add that by the end of hostilities 5.2 million men had served in the army. The experience was to define a generation and the warfare this, at least to begin with, "..largely amateur army.." encountered provided an experience that had to be recounted.[281] The wealth of memoirs, letters and even soldier newspapers, as the men communicated with loved ones back home and with each other, have provided us with an insight into not only how the men experienced war but how they actually viewed the enemy they were there to fight.[282] In looking at the correspondence of soldiers, John Horne notes that the reality of the front compared to the idealistic image was something that had to be dealt with by both society and the soldiers themselves, requiring "..radical readjustment.." of behaviour.[283] The heroic ideal of charging into battle was replaced by the "squalid" inactivity of the trenches, where "...Opponents rarely saw each other.." and yet for long periods were so close that they could even "..hear a chap coughing."[284] This close experience led to at times much interaction, for example with the events of Christmas Day 1914.

The reason this has reached such mythological status is due to the fact that we look back on it with the perceptions of the modern day.[285] Such an occurrence to a modern audience seems incredible as it happened between two sides engaged in warfare, yet what it forgotten is that the Armistice was pre-arranged. Private Frank Sumpter talks of singing carols with the Germans, shaking hands between the barbed wire of no man's land and ignoring officers' orders to stop fraternising.[286] Sergeant George Ashurst mentions the armistice to say that, though officially ending at 1pm, it was still being carried on at 5pm. For him, just to get out of the trench, was "..heaven.." He is openly critical of the reaction back in England, wishing that the journalists and parsons who had been passing judgement were "..here in front of us instead of Jerry so we could shoot them down...."[287] Lieutenant John Wedderburn-Maxwell, though cautious at first, was soon laughing with the Germans, exchanging tobacco and even took a letter from one of them to post to his girlfriend in Manchester.[288] There are numerous other examples of such interaction.[289] By the evening the Generals on both sides had taken over and had issued orders to fire, though according to Rifleman Henry Williamson a note came over first to warn them of the time it would start and asking them to ".. keep under cover in case regrettable accidents occurred..."[290] Other letters, however, do not paint such a rosy picture; in one area of the trenches the truce was refused by the Germans.[291] The events of Christmas day show us that the truce was, in most part, embraced and welcomed by both sides. In recounting it the English soldiers show that there was much common ground between the men and that it was conducted with the greatest decorum with little or no animosity.

There appears, from the sources studied, to have been a lot of professional respect from the 'Tommies' towards the Germans, particularly in regards to their artillery.[292] This is voiced by an officer of the R.AM.C. in a letter from the front published in The Times on the 27th November and by Captain Harry Yoxall. "...I do not – feel much rancour....'Forgive them, for they know not what they do' – and they do it jolly well."[293] According to Brown it was, "..remarkable how little animosity was felt for the men in field grey on the other side of the wire."[294] There was an understanding that they were there to do a job; it was their duty to fight.[295] Fighting also meant killing and there is no denying that there were those who relished it.[296] An officer, from the 27th November writes, "...I have never enjoyed life more."[297] On the 28th November 1914, Private W. Jackson retells of an engagement with the Prussian Guard. "It was just like shooting rabbits on Shillingstone Hill instead of killing men; they came up so thick that you couldn't miss them."[298] Though making it clear he pities their casualties, as far as he is concerned it is a job well done. An officer in the East Lancashires portrays an attitude of outright enjoyment. "Then the fun began; we enfiladed them and knocked them over like rabbits."[299] Brown notes that such "Killing at a distance..." was easier to stomach as "..distant targets did not so obviously declare their humanity...."[300] Technology certainly played a large part in this.[301] The reference to them as animals is perhaps part of this distancing, though they have in no terms become the "beastly Hun."[302] However, there could also be the enjoyment of close-up bayonet work, seen by one soldier as "gorgeously satisfying."[303]

There is an acknowledgement in the soldiers' correspondence that warfare was beginning to change.[304] "At present it's a mere matter of killing – there is none of the sporting side of war....."[305] This is emphasised by Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier, writing that the British soldier, though ".. a kindly fellow," must be induced to kill with "..brute-like bestiality..." in order to win.[306] This is not the attitude of an English gentleman, but something far more sinister. It is evident though that in most part the English soldier did not embrace such values and while doing their job to the best of their ability, still managed to retain a respect for the adversary they were engaging. This is disputed by Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, who assert that it is clear in the war that a "..threshold had been crossed..."[307] They argue that the fact that officers were now placed in internment camps at all, that certain areas were bombed until destroyed and the wounded finished off in many instances provides evidence for a discernible shift. Local truces that occurred provide an unusual exception, though "..clearly indicated the soldiers' determination to limit the level of reciprocal violence ..."[308] Though, indeed, the scale of fighting and the war meant such instances were unavoidable, it is debatable especially during the first two years of the war that there had been a total break from conduct of the past.

There is much evidence to suggest that the two armies were still fighting in 1914 along the lines of civilised warfare, not only from the accounts of the men doing the fighting but from the experience of the POW's in the camps.[309] Captain Philip Neame talks of moving a wounded man in full view of the Germans, who never fired upon him. In his opinion they "..seemed to respect our task.."[310] This behaviour was reciprocated. Sergeant George Ashurst provides an engaging account of occupying a line of cottages opposite a German line and of the "friendly" exchanges between them. However, when they did finally engage the Germans, the officer in charge allowed a German soldier to collect his wounded friend in front of them and ordered them not to fire.[311] During the first battle of the Marne, Sergeant Thomas Painting recalls taking four hundred and fifty prisoners and making sure they were well looked after. The fact that such instances occurred shows that an established practice of warfare was still being adhered to.[312] In light of such generous, compassionate behaviour to the enemy, it is perhaps hard to digest how such hard treatment could be meted out, in cases such as desertion, from the English army to their own men.[313] However, this is another example of how the war was still being fought on firm, also called "...oppressive and savage...," lines of conduct by those in charge.[314] Such cowardice was unbecoming to a man of the British army and to desert, to abandon your regiment and your friends, was a severe crime.[315] Though the ideals of the correct way to wage war were by no means always followed, the first two years of the war provide compelling evidence that such values were still highly prized. The etiquette of behaviour and the distinction of rank all reinforced this.[316] Though Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker claim the system "collapsed," they are assessing it in light of the entire duration of the war.[317] Certainly in terms of civilised warfare and "othering," the feelings towards the enemy do not appear to have won out, in the majority of cases, over an established code of behaviour; there is not the wholesale shift they are claiming.

It is interesting to then consider how men felt pushing in to 1915, with the war dragging on and the introduction of poison gas into the experience of war.[318] As Pope makes clear, by the end of 1914 the British army had experienced enough to give an "..indication of the scale of casualties to be expected" and 1915 merely continued to provide the proof.[319] George Buxton, a devoted Christian, wrote to his brother about the reason why he could continue to fight. "I should hate to kill anybody, but then those who are carrying rifles are not murderers, they equally are human and don't love killing others, they do it because it's their duty."[320] Poison gas was first used that year in the Second Battle of Ypres on the 22nd April and Lance-Sergeant Elmer Cotton provides a brutal depiction of the poison's effects.[321] The use of gas was widely condemned and outrage ensued and this anger, unsurprisingly, did find its way to the front.[322] "The only way to save our women and babies is to destroy the German Army...I repeat, we are not playing a game of cricket, we are fighting and dying of suffocation for our lives."[323] This is compared to the simple statement, "Saw gassed men – blue faces choking and gasping. How we hate the Germans."[324] Though condemned by the allies, gas was quickly adopted by them.[325] The nature of warfare was changing, called by Brown "... another down-spiral in an already seriously unlovely war."[326]

However, truces still continued in to 1915, for example with the practice of stopping after a battle to collect the wounded on both sides.[327] Lieutenant J.D. Wyatt, recounts the story of a patrol sent near to the German lines to listen in. Having stayed some time they were just about to leave when, "...a voice from the German trenches said in perfect English, 'If you don't go away soon, we shall really have to shoot you.'"[328] There were also still opportunities to enjoy the diversion of interacting with the other side. Private Ernest Todd speaks fondly of "those summer months of 1915," spent talking and singing with the Germans in a nearby line.[329] This however, did not prevent either side from doing their job and shooting at the other side if an opportunity prevented itself. There was always the pleasure of the soldiers getting "..their own back..," for any losses sustained.[330] For Lieutenant Cyril Rawlins, writing to his mother on the 1 July 1915, it was a clear fight to the death; Germany could not be allowed to prevail. "....we are fighting for our very life as an Empire and as a nation against a foe without mercy....."[331] In the majority of the extracts from letters and diaries and in the letters from the front that appeared in The Times over 1914 and 1915, the tone is business like; the soldiers recount or list the day's events, the fighting that has occurred and their role in it. Emotions against the Germans, and animosity, play little part in it. However, in the words of Captain Harry Yoxall, "...we shall not forget the people who made the war."[332] For William Clarke, "...they were soldiers like ourselves, manipulated by statesmen and generals and war-mongers. We were – they were – cannon fodder."[33]

Though dwelling little on feelings towards the enemy, there was energy and time to recount the realities of combat when faced with the task of killing and watching others die. Lieutenant R.A. Chell killed his first German soldier in September 1915. The first time his head appeared in plain view he could not shoot him in "cold blood." He instead shot him the second time, now able to do his duty, as he felt that the soldier had already "..been given a very sporting chance..."[334] However, he admits, "...I felt funny for days....."[335] Sapper Garfield Powell, on hearing that a friend was wounded, confesses 'One thinks that I would feel anger, burning anger, against the Germans. Not so! The whole damned show is so impersonal that one cannot..."[336] So even against an enemy who were inflicting great casualties and suffering there was no increase in anger. It instead was directed towards those prolonging the war, adding to the clamour of voices questioning the war itself and the reasons it was being fought for.[337] In terms of the soldier newspapers, produced by all sides and examined by Robert L. Nelson, this assessment stands out.

"One of the most striking absences in the soldier newspapers of all combatant forces is the lack of an image of the 'hated' enemy. To be sure, there were attacks upon the abstract enemy nations and their leaders, but the soldiers opposite, hunkered down in the cold and wet trenches, suffering the same daily pains and discomforts as the newspaper authors and editors, were virtually never depicted as anything but worthy adversaries."[338]

This is certainly telling of the widespread attitudes of the men. They are filled with humour and provided an outlet from the stresses of the war.[339] This is in contrast to the newspapers back home, which often created more anger and resentment than the enemy they were supposed to be fighting.[340] In May 1915 J.H. Early "..sent a letter in response to a press cutting. He rebuked his family with the words, 'You get no "brutal Huns" here."[341] Andersen concludes that the soldiers, "..began to chafe at the "jauntiness of tone" of reporting that often implied that a battle was a "jovial picnic."[342] It is widely documented that the journalists were often not reporting back the full story and were stopped from doing so as information was manipulated and controlled by the Press Bureau and even Kitchener himself, so as not to alarm the public.[343] 1915 and the continuation of hostilities did not produce a greater hatred for the Germans, but underlined that the real enemy they were all facing were those in charge of sending them out to fight and die.

It has been claimed that two contrasting images of the soldier have emerged over time. The first is disillusioned with the war and government, found to be "..emphathizing with the enemy..." and the second is the brave, heroic, propaganda-led image. However, for Farrar, Jr., the true soldier lies somewhere in between.[344] The soldiers assessed here were complex individuals, who could change from a soldier who did his duty, tasked to fight and kill, to a man who could find time to joke with the enemy and empathise with them. Just as distance could help them to kill, as Joanna Bourke notes, "..personalizing the foe could....[form] a buffer against numbing brutality."[345] In analysing their words this chapter has highlighted that the men were more concerned about their day to day job and living through it than on dwelling on hatred for the other side.[346] Of course it existed, but in the sources examined from 1914 and 1915 there is no evidence of "othering" or of a construction of the German soldier as an ideological enemy. They did not become "The demonized enemy.." who "..without the quality of empathy can be killed with impunity."[347] There are many allusions to the policy of 'live and let live' which occurred, an agreement on both sides not to fire.[348] Such a policy, highlighted by The Minden Magazine in December 1915, is the final indication that for the English soldiers the Germans were not an "other" but flesh and blood men who simply, just like them, wanted to go home.[349]

Conclusion

This work has in essence sought to discover whether England built Germany up as an "other" from 1900 onwards. It assessed previous warfare linked to "total war" and the occurrence of "absolute enmity," for comparison purposes, to establish if a rhetoric of the "other" ever dominated England on the run up to and including the first two years of the war.[350] It then analysed English society prior to 1914 to see if biological racism, the shadow of social Darwinism, Eugenics and English "arrogance" ever combined to set the scene for the "othering" of Germany.[351] Taking evidence of the time, through newspapers and personal accounts, through the words of the battlefield, it looked into the minds of the very soldiers doing the killing and what they said about the men they had to face. The answer, undeniably, is that Germany and the Germans were never made into the "other" before the First World War or through 1914 to 1915. This is not to deny that some newspapers attempted to stir up ill feeling towards Germany, that there was disbelief and anger at the German practices of war and that Germans living in England were threatened and mistreated. However, the important distinction is that these occurrences did not mean that a widespread, national feeling of Germany as the contrast to the ideals and values of England was ever produced.

Though many have claimed that the barbaric practices of the First World War formed the next stepping stone in the practice of war, this is not the case. This period has been examined closely in order to get beneath the myth and the illusion and seen in its own context there are many instances already highlighted that show that there was not a wholesale break with the past, the line had not "been crossed."[352] As Gregory states, the war "..was undertaken reluctantly by a people who quite genuinely believed in the value of peace and not by a crazed jingoistic mob..."[353] He goes on to suggest that a "..culture of hatred.." did develop during 1914, but that the "..process was more organic and less artificial than is commonly supposed."[354] However, even now, historians are writing about the demonic, barbaric 'Hun' as though it was universally accepted at the beginning of the war. This attitude was not embraced by the majority of the population and certainly not by the soldiers themselves, who actually having fought with the enemy, been injured and had friends killed by them, would have understandably been those most predisposed to see them as the "other." The sources indicate instead, however, that anger was directed towards those at home, the newspapers and the politicians themselves, rather than the men in the opposite trench.

Omer Bartov, among others, sees the First World War as crucial in understanding the events of the Second World War.[355] He sees it as the birthplace of the ideas and technology, hatred and passions that would produce the Holocaust. Bartov argues that such a creation of "hell on earth" was only possible as a descendant of the carnage of the First World War and that technology had produced a distancing, an "industrial killing," that alleviated the psychological burden of taking a life.[356] This created "...modern war's depersonalizing effect.."[357] He cites a direct link back to 1793, the practices of warfare that were altered and the change (that Bell uses frequently) of the "individual's role in battle" and a "..new concept of national identity.."[358] Bartov believes that the First World War destroyed forever the "..European image of war as an exercise in chivalry."[359] This line of causality means that the Holocaust could not have happened without the escalation of warfare during the First World War, the First World War without that of the Napoleonic period.[360] Benjamin Madley argues that the Holocaust was an end product of the German experience in South West Africa and the practices they developed there.[361] As with Bell and Bartov, the argument for this line is compelling, but ultimately neglects to dissect that war is a much more complex web of instances of compassion and hatred intermingled. Bartov and Bell's argument lie on the foundation that an occurrence of "total enmity" towards the enemy happened during the First World War and yet this in depth look at England and English society shows that not even an "othering" developed.

The carnage and horrors of the First World War, including the supposed atrocities, produced a wave of revulsion of the practices of war and an atmosphere of national commemoration and solidarity.[362] In the aftermath of a war that had caused so many casualties, there was a backlash against the war itself, the propaganda machine and the lies it had spun. The opinions produced in the inter-war years created a long-standing acceptance that the First World War had been unlike any other, that the horrific nature and animosity it created had forever scarred society.[363] The view that brutalisation and violence were now "..lodged at the heart of Western society."[364] Said, looking back at the evils of imperialism and nationalism, from a world that had experienced the Second World War, made it clear that for him "Orientalism and modern anti-Semitism have common roots."[365] Howard asks the question whether Britain could have gone the same way as Germany if she had lost the war, if the feelings stirred up "..would have turned sour and fanatical..."[366] He decides ultimately that it "...would be realistic to assume that we would not have been immune to the disease."[367] Too often historians are judging and evaluating the First World War in the shadow of the Second. This misleads them into finding, among other things, instances of an "othering" and beyond that, in most cases, an "absolute enmity," that did not prevail.[368 Though it may provide comfort for them to spell out a simple cause and effect for war, we must continue to look beneath the surface to the real story.

This re-reading of the English experience in the run up to the First World War and then during its first two years, has shown that we still have much to learn about this conflict. English society, in this period, has for far too long been tainted with the overriding image of an incensed, seething mob intent on wiping out Germany and all its citizens. It is time for this taint to be removed once and for all.

Bibliography

  • 19th Century British Library Newspapers. (2011). Hampshire Telegraph and Naval Chronicle. Retrieved September 21, 2011. (Full references in footnotes)
  • 19th Century British Library Newspapers. (2011). Penny Illustrated Paper. Retrieved September 22, 2011. (Full references in footnotes)
  • 19th Century British Library Newspapers. (2011). Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times. Retrieved September 22, 2011. (Full references in footnotes)
  • 19th Century British Library Newspapers. (2011) The Standard. Retrieved September 21, 2011. (Full reference in footnotes)
  • Andersen, Robin, A Century of Media, A Century of War, (New York: Peter Lang, 2007)
  • Arthur, Max, Forgotten Voices of the Great War in Association with the Imperial War Museum, (London: Ebury Press, 2003)
  • Audoin-Rouzeau, Stéphane and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002)
  • Baillie, J.B., 'Prefatory note to the Second edition', in G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind. Translated, with an introduction and notes by J.B. Baillie, Second edition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931 [first edition 1910]), pp. 9-10.
  • Baillie, J.B., 'Translator's Introduction', in G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind. Translated, with an introduction and notes by J.B. Baillie, Second edition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931 [first edition 1910]), pp. 11-54.
  • Baillie, J.B., 'The Truth Which Conscious Certainty of Self Realizes', in G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind. Translated, with an introduction and notes by J.B. Baillie, Second edition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931 [first edition 1910]), p. 217.
  • Bartov, Omer, Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
  • Beaven, Brad, 'The Provincial Press, Civic Ceremony and the Citizen-Soldier During the Boer War, 1899-1902: A Study of Local Patriotism', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 37, 2009, pp. 207-228.
  • Bell, David, The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008)
  • Berenson, Frances, 'Hegel on Others and the Self', Philosophy, 57, 1982, pp. 77-90.
  • Bettany, Shona and Russell W. Belk, 'Disney discourses of self and Other: animality, primitivity, modernity, and postmodernity', Consumption Markets & Culture, 14, 2011, pp. 163-176.
  • Boucher, David, 'Book Review', American Political Science Review, 96, 2002, pp. 182-183.
  • Bourke, Joanna, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare, (New York: Basic Books, 1999)
  • Brown, Malcolm, The Imperial War Museum Book of the Western Front, (London: Pan Books, 2001)
  • Brown, Malcolm, Tommy Goes to War in association with the Imperial War Museum, (Stroud: Tempus Publishing, 2005)
  • Chappell, Timothy, The Inescapable Self: An introduction to Western philosophy since Descartes, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005)
  • Chesney, General Sir George Tomkyns, 'The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer', in I.F. Clarke (ed.), The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1995), pp. 27-73.
  • Chickering, Roger, 'Book Review', War in History, 14, 2007, pp. 378-379.
  • Clarke, I.F., 'Introduction: The Paper Warriors and their Flights of Fancy', in I.F. Clarke (ed.), The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1995), pp. 1-26.
  • Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997)
  • Coetzee, Frans and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee, 'Introduction', in Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee (eds.), Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995); pp. vii-xxii.
  • Cramer, Kevin, 'Review Article: A World of Enemies: New Perspectives on German Military Culture and the Origins of the First World War', Central European History, 39, 2006, pp. 270-298.
  • Crook, Paul, 'Historical Monkey Business: The Myth of a Darwinized British Imperial Discourse', History, 84, 1999, pp. 633-657.
  • Dawn, C. Ernest, 'Book Review', The American Historical Review, 84, 1979, p. 1134.
  • DeGroot, Gerard J., Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War, (London: Longman, 1996)
  • Dikötter, Frank, 'Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics', The American Historical Review, 103, 1998, pp. 467-478.
  • Elliott, Anthony, Concepts of the Self, Second edition, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007 [first edition 2001])
  • Epstein, Robert M., 'Patterns of Change and Continuity in Nineteenth Century Warfare', The Journal of Military History, 56, 1992, pp. 375-388.
  • Evans, Hilary and Dik Evans, 'Peter Pan came from Outer Space', in Hilary and Dik Evans (eds.), Beyond the Gaslight: Science in Popular Fiction, 1895-1905, (London: Muller, 1976), pp. 7-22.
  • Evans, Hilary and Dik, 'Science with the dessert course', in Hilary and Dik Evans (eds.), Beyond the Gaslight: Science in Popular Fiction, 1895-1905, (London: Muller, 1976), pp. 23-35.
  • Evans, Hilary and Dik, 'What's to come is still unsure', in Hilary and Dik Evans (eds.), Beyond the Gaslight: Science in Popular Fiction, 1895-1905, (London: Muller, 1976), pp. 152-160.
  • Farrar, Jr., L.L., 'Nationalism in Wartime: Critiquing the Conventional Wisdom', in Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee (eds.), Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995); pp. 133-151.
  • Fest, Wilfried, 'Jingoism and Xenophobia in the Electioneering Strategies of British Ruling Elites before 1914', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981); pp. 171-189.
  • Francis-Williams, Lord. (1968). Mass Communications, 1914-15: Propaganda 1914-15. History of the 20th Century, 793-801.
  • Gran, Peter, 'Book Review', Journal of the American Oriental Society, 100, 1980, pp. 328-321.
  • Gregory, Adrian, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
  • Harle, Vilho, 'On the Concepts of the "Other" and the "Enemy", History of European Ideas, 19, 1994, pp. 27-34.
  • Hegel, G.W.F., The Phenomenology of Mind. Translated, with an introduction and notes by J.B. Baillie, Second edition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931 [first edition 1910])
  • Horne, John, 'Soldiers, Civilians and the Warfare of Attrition: Representations of Combat in France, 1914-1918', in Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee (eds.), Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995); pp. 223-249.
  • Howard, Michael, 'Empire, Race & War in pre-1914 Britain', History Today, 31, 1981, pp. 4-11.
  • Hyam, Ronald, Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion, Third Edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002 [first edition 1976])
  • Jones, Greta, Social Darwinism and English Thought: The Interaction between Biological and Social Theory, (Brighton: Harvester, 1980)
  • Kabbani, Rana, Europe's Myths of the Orient: Devise and Rule, (London: Pandora, 1988)
  • Kelly, Alfred, The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860-1914, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1981)
  • Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1869-1914, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980)
  • Kennedy, Paul and Nicholls, Anthony, (eds.), 'Preface', in Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981); pp. vii-viii.
  • Kerr, Malcolm H., Book Review', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12, 1980, pp. 544-547.
  • Khalid, 'Gender, orientalism and representations of the 'Other' in the War on Terror', Global Change, Peace and Security, 23, 2011, pp. 15-29.
  • Maalouf, Amin, In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong, (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2001)
  • Madley, Benjamin, 'From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe', European History Quarterly, 35, 2005, pp. 429-464.
  • Marwick, Arthur, Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and Social Change 1900-1967, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1970)
  • Neilson, Keith, 'Total War: Total History', Military Affairs, 51, pp. 117-19.
  • Nelson, Robert L., 'Soldier Newspapers: A Useful Source in the Social and Cultural History of the First World War and Beyond', War in History, 17, 2010, pp. 167-191.
  • Nicholson, John B. (1915). The Great War Archive: John B. Nicholson's Letter Home. Retrieved September 17, 2011.
  • O'Donnell, T.C. (1915). Firstworldwar.com: Memoirs and Diaries: The Retreat from Mons and the Battle of Loos. Retrieved September 17, 2011.
  • Panayi, Panikos, The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War, (Providence, R.I.:Berg Publishers, 1991)
  • Pinkney, Will, 'C E Montague, Liberal War Writers and the Great War', The RUSI Journal, 155, 2010, pp. 82-86.
  • Pope, Rex, War and Society in Britain 1899-1948, (Harlow: Longman, 1991)
  • Porter, Bernard, 'Debate: Further Thoughts on Imperial Absent-Mindedness', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 36, 2008, pp. 101-117.
  • Powell, David, The Edwardian Crisis: Britain, 1901-1914, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996)
  • Purcell, Sarah J., 'Review Article: War, Memory and National Identity in the Twentieth Century', National Identities, 2, 2000, pp. 187-195.
  • Robb, George, British Culture and the First World War, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)
  • Roberts, J.M. (1968). Introduction to The Home Fronts. History of the 20th Century, 785-812; p. 785.
  • Rohe, Karl, 'The British Intelligensia and the Kaiserreich', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981); pp. 130-142.
  • Sabol, Steven, 'Editorial: A brief note from the Editor', First World War Studies, 1, 2010, pp. 1-2.
  • Said, Edward W., Culture and Imperialism, (London: Vintage, 1994)
  • Said, Edward W., Orientalism, (London: Penguin Books, 2003)
  • Sanders, M.L. and Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-18, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1982)
  • Schmitt, Carl. (1963) The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political. Retrieved September 3, 2011.
  • Schmitt, Carl, The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007)
  • Solomon, Robert C., A History of Western Philosophy: 7. Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988)
  • Steiner, Zara S. and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, Second edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003 [first edition 1977])
  • Stewart, David, James Fitzgerald and Alf Pickard, The Great War: Sources and Evidence, Second edition, (Melbourne: Nelson, 1995 [first edition 1987])
  • Strong, Tracy B., 'Foreward: Dimensions of the New Debate around Carl Schmitt', in Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); pp. ix-xxxi.
  • Summers, Anne, 'The Character of Edwardian Nationalism: Three Popular Leagues', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981); pp. 68-87.
  • The Times Digital Archive. (2011). The Times. Retrieved September 21, 2011. (Dates used: Friday 16th March 1900 – Tuesday 3rd August 1915. Full references in footnotes)
  • Wawro, Geoffrey, Warfare and Society in Europe 1792-1914, (London: Routledge, 2000)
  • Willmot, Louise, 'Introduction', in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997); pp. ix-xxiii; pp. ix-xii.
  • Wilson, Trevor, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986)
  • Wingfield, Nancy M., 'Introduction', in Nancy M. Wingfield (ed.), Creating The Other: Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004); pp. 1-16.
  • Winter, J.M., The Great War and the British People, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1987)
  • Wizen, Peter, 'Treitschke's Influence on the Rise of Imperialist and Anti-British Nationalism in Germany', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981); pp. 154-170.
  • Zeman, Z.A.B. (1968). Propaganda and Subversion. History of the 20th Century, 802-808.
  • Zimmer, Oliver, Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)

[1] Steven Sabol, 'Editorial: A brief note from the Editor', First World War Studies, 1, 2010, pp. 1-2; p. 1; Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002); p. 3.

[2] Bell, David, The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008)
[3] M.L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War, 1914-18, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1982); p. 137.
[4] Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (London: Penguin Books, 2003); Bell, First.
[5] Robin Andersen, A Century of Media, A Century of War, (New York: Peter Lang, 2007); pp. xvi-xviv and pp. 4-6.
[6] George Robb, British Culture and the First World War, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); p. 8.
[7] Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
[8] Bell, First, p. 6; Omer Bartov, Murder in Our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); pp. 15-20.
[9] Oliver Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); p.7; Said, Orientalism.
[10] Zimmer, Nationalism, p. 5 and 25.
[11] Michael Howard, 'Empire, Race & War in pre-1914 Britain', History Today, 31, 1981, pp. 4-11; p. 6 and 76; I.F. Clarke, 'Introduction: The Paper Warriors and their Flights of Fancy', in I.F. Clarke (ed.), The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1995), pp. 1-26; p. 10. and pp. 18-19.

[12] David Powell, The Edwardian Crisis: Britain, 1901-1914, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); pp. 164-165; Howard, 'Empire', pp. 9-10.
[13] Geoffrey Wawro, Warfare and Society in Europe 1792-1914, (London: Routledge, 2000); pp. 142-144.
[14] J.B. Baillie, 'Translator's Introduction', in G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind. Translated, with an introduction and notes by J.B. Baillie, Second edition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931 [first edition 1910]), pp. 11-54; p. 11.

[1] Hegel, Phenomenology, pp. 80-81.
[2] J.B. Baillie, 'The Truth Which Conscious Certainty of Self Realizes', in G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind. Translated, with an introduction and notes by J.B. Baillie, Second edition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931 [first edition 1910]), p. 217.
[3] Anthony Elliott, Concepts of the Self, Second edition, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007 [first edition 2001]); p. 61; Frances Berenson, 'Hegel on Others and the Self', Philosophy, 57, 1982, pp. 77-90; p. 77.
[4] Berenson, 'Hegel', p. 77 and 90; Robert C. Solomon, A History of Western Philosophy: 7. Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and the Fall of the Self, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); pp. 5-7; Vilho Harle, 'On the Concepts of the "Other" and the "Enemy", History of European Ideas, 19, 1994, pp. 27-34; Nancy M. Wingfield, 'Introduction', in Nancy M. Wingfield (ed.), Creating The Other: Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004); pp. 1-16; Maryam Khalid, 'Gender, orientalism and representations of the 'Other' in the War on Terror', Global Change, Peace & Security, 23, 2011, pp. 15-29.
[5] Solomon, History, p. 5; Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong, (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2001); p. 9.
[6] Solomon, History, p. 3 and pp. 6-7.
[7] Elliott, Concepts, p. 10.
[8] Elliott, Concepts, p. 14.
[9] Elliott, Concepts, p. 10.
[10]Elliott, Concepts, p. 4.
[11]Timothy Chappell, The Inescapable Self: An introduction to Western philosophy since Descartes, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005); pp. 16-17.
[12]Said, Orientalism, pp. 1-2.
[13]Said, Orientalism, pp. 1-2.
[14] Said, Orientalism, p. 3.
[15 Said, Orientalism, p. 3.
[16] Solomon, History, pp. 64-65.
[17] Peter Gran, 'Book Review', Journal of the American Oriental Society, 100, 1980, pp. 328-321; p. 328; Malcolm H. Kerr, Book Review', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12, 1980, pp. 544-547; p. 544.
[18] Rana Kabbani, Europe's Myths of the Orient: Devise and Rule, (London: Pandora, 1988); p. 3.
[19] Karl Rohe, 'The British Intelligensia and the Kaiserreich', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 130-142; p. 132; Zara S. Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003); p. 18.
[20] Said, Orientalism, p. 227.
[21] Said, Orientalism, p. 232.
[22] Said, Orientalism, pp. xi-xiv and p. xviii.
[23] Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and Social Change 1900-1967, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970); Keith Neilson, 'Total War: Total History', Military Affairs, 51, 1987, pp. 117-19; Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee, 'Introduction', in Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee (eds.), Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), pp. vii-xxii; p. viii.
[24] Said, Orientalism, p. 332.
[25] C. Ernest Dawn, 'Book Review', The American Historical Review, 84, 1979, p. 1334.
[26] Khalid, 'Gender', pp. 15-29.
[27] Carl Schmitt. (1963). The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political by Carl Schmitt. Retrieved September 3, 2011, from http://www.scribd.com/doc/8005192/Theory-of-the-Partisan-by-Dr-Carl-Schmitt; Bell, First, p. 14.
[28] Schmitt, Theory, p. 35.
[29] Schmitt, Theory, p. 3; Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, p. 29.
[30] Schmitt, Theory, p. 6 and 24.
[31] Schmitt, Theory, p. 4 and 5.
[32] Bell, First, p. 10.
[33] Louise Willmot, 'Introduction', in Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997), pp. ix-xxiii; pp. ix-xii; Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, p. 29.
[34] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997); pp. 333-337.
[35] Schmitt, Theory, p. 35.
[36] Bell, First, p. 15.
[37] Bell, First, p. 8.
[38] Bell, First, p. 9.
[39] Bell, First, p. 7; Roger Chickering, 'Book Review', War in History, 14, 2007, pp. 378-379; p. 378.
[40] Bell, First, p. 8.
[41] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, p. 16.
[42] Bell, First, pp. 11-12, p. 125 and p. 314.
[43] Said, Orientalism, pp. xvi-xvii.
[44] Bell, First, pp. 84-119.
[45] Bell, First, p. 143 and 207.
[46] Bell, First, pp. 12-13.
[47] Bell, First, p. 5.
[48] Harle, 'Concepts', p. 29.
[49] Harle, 'Concepts', p. 28.
[50] Harle, 'Concepts', p. 28; Maalouf, Name, p. 14.
[51] Harle, 'Concepts', p. 30.
[52] Bell, First, pp. 14-15.
[53] Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); pp. 35-36.
[54] Tracy B. Strong, 'Foreward: Dimensions of the New Debate around Carl Schmitt', in Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. ix-xxxi; p. xxi.
[55] Wingfield, 'Introduction', pp. 1-16.
[56] Wingfield, 'Introduction', p. 1.
[57] David Boucher, 'Book Review', American Political Science Review, 96, 2002, pp. 182-183; Shona Bettany and Russell W. Belk, 'Disney discourses of self and Other: animality, primitivity, modernity, and postmodernity', Consumption Markets & Culture, 14, 2011, pp. 163-176.
[58] Bell, First, pp. 5-13.
[59] Robert M. Epstein, 'Patterns of Change and Continuity in Nineteenth Century Warfare', The Journal of Military History, 56, 1992, pp. 375-388; pp. 376-378.
[60] Epstein, 'Patterns', pp. 379-381.
[61] Epstein, 'Patterns', p. 381.
[62] Epstein, 'Patterns', pp. 385-386; Malcolm Brown, Tommy Goes to War in association with the Imperial War Museum, (Stroud: Tempus Publishing, 2005); p. 46.
[63] Epstein, 'Patterns', pp. 387-388; Wawro, Warfare, p. 113.
[64] Ronald Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion, Third edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002 [first edition 1976]); p. 211.
[65] Wawro, Warfare, p. 137.
[66] Wawro, Warfare, p. 143.
[67] Wawro, Warfare, p. 144.
[68] Wawro, Warfare, p. 125 and p. 144.
[69] Wawro, Warfare, p. 129.
[70] Wawro, Warfare, p. 144.
[71] Wawro, Warfare, p. 145.
[72] Clarke, 'Introduction', p. 18.
[73] Bernard Porter, 'Debate: Further Thoughts on Imperial Absent-Mindedness', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 36, 2008, pp. 101-117; p. 102.
[74] Bernard Porter, 'Debate', p. 108.
[75] Hilary and Dik Evans, 'Peter Pan came from Outer Space', in Hilary and Dik Evans (eds.), Beyond the Gaslight: Science in Popular Fiction, 1895-1905, (London: Muller, 1976), pp. 7-22; pp. 7-8.
[76] Clarke, 'Introduction', p. 10. and pp. 18-19; Hilary and Dik Evans, 'Peter', pp. 7-8.
[77] Hyam, Britain's, p. 76.
[78] Powell, Edwardian, pp. 1-2.
[79] Howard, 'Empire', p. 10; Coetzee and Shevin-Coetzee, 'Introduction', p. ix; Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1869-1914, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980); p. 251; Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 46.
[80] Howard, 'Empire', p. 6.
[81] Howard, 'Empire', pp. 5-6.
[82] Howard, 'Empire', p. 7.
[83] Hyam, Britain's, p. 75; Howard, 'Empire', p. 7.
[84] Howard, 'Empire', p. 8; Porter, 'Debate', p. 110.
[85] Robb, British, p. 13.
[86] Hyam, Britain's, pp. 76-77.
[87] Hyam, Britain's, p. 76 and pp. 155-156.
[88] Wawro, Warfare, p. 125.
[89] Howard, 'Empire', p. 7; Hyam, Britain's, p. 77; Greta Jones, Social Darwinism and English Thought: The Interaction between Biological and Social Theory, (Brighton: Harvester, 1980); p. 145.
[90] Hilary and Dik Evans, 'Science with the dessert course', in Hilary and Dik Evans (eds.), Beyond the Gaslight: Science in Popular Fiction, 1895-1905, (London: Muller, 1976), pp. 23-35; p. 23.
[91] Alfred Kelly, The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860-1914, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1981); pp. 4-5.
[92] Hyam, Britain's, p. 157, p. 303 and p. 204; Jones, Social, p. 142; Paul Crook, 'Historical Monkey Business: The Myth of a Darwinized British Imperial Discourse', History, 84, 1999, pp. 633-657; p. 645.
[93] Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 17.; Hyam, Britain's, p. 157.
[94] Wilfried Fest, 'Jingoism and Xenophobia in the Electioneering Strategies of British Ruling Elites before 1914', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 171-189; p. 174.
[95] Brad Beaven, 'The Provincial Press, Civic Ceremony and the Citizen-Soldier During the Boer War, 1899-1902: A Study of Local Patriotism', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 37, 2009, pp. 207-228; p. 209; Rex Pope, War and Society in Britain 1899-1948, (Harlow: Longman, 1991); p. 19.
[96] Hyam, Britain's, p. 242 and 247; Pope, War, p. 2.
[97] Kennedy, Rise, p. 361.
[98] Howard, 'Empire', p. 7.
[99] Unknown Author. Events of 1900. Hampshire Telegraph and Naval Chronicle, (Saturday 29th December, 1900); p. 4.
[100] James Caldwell. Conscription. The Standard, (Wednesday 26th December, 1900); p. 7.
[101] Unknown Author. Boer Victory. Hampshire Telegraph and Naval Chronicle, (Saturday 15th December, 1900); p. 5.
[102] Unknown Author. Editorials/Leaders. The Times, (Saturday 18th January, 1902); p. 11.
[103] Unknown Author. The Extraordinary Outburst of Anglophobia. The Times, (Wednesday 20th November, 1901); p. 9; Own Correspondent. Mr Chamberlain's Speech. The Times, (Tuesday 29th October, 1901); p. 3.
[104] Gregory, Last, p. 45.
[105] Powell, Edwardian, p. 2.
[106] Howard, 'Empire', p. 9.
[107] Clarke, 'Introduction', pp. 13-15; J.M. Winter, The Great War and the British People, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1987); p. 6.
[108] Clarke, 'Introduction', p. 1.
[109] Howard, 'Empire', p. 10; Coetzee and Shevin-Coetzee, 'Introduction', p. ix; Kennedy, Rise, p. 251; Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 46; Hyam, Britain's, p. 258.
[110] Hyam, Britain's, pp. 273-275; Powell, Edwardian, pp. 15-16 and 140-141.
[111] Powell, Edwardian, p. 140; Kennedy, Rise, p. 371.
[112] Hyam, Britain's, p. 162; Howard, 'Empire', p. 9; Kennedy, Rise, p. 371 and p. 375; Powell, Edwardian, p. 140.
[113] Kennedy, Rise, p. 376.
[114] Kennedy, Rise, p. 382.
[115] Howard, 'Empire', pp. 10-11; Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); p. 13.
[116] Crook, 'Historical', p. 633.
[117] Crook, 'Historical', pp. 641-642.
[118] Crook, 'Historical', pp. 645-646; Wawro, Warfare, p. 141.
[119] Crook, 'Historical', p. 651.
[120] Kennedy, Rise, pp. 378-379.
[121] Jones, Social, p. 99; Crook, 'Historical', p. 644; Powell, Edwardian, p. 166; Pope, War, p. 31; Kennedy, Rise, p. 324.
[122] Winter, Great, p. 9 and p. 11.
[123] Anne Summers, 'The Character of Edwardian Nationalism: Three Popular Leagues', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 68-87; p.77; Robb, British, p. 7.
[124] Fest, 'Jingoism', p. 171; Kennedy, Rise, p. 361.
[125] Powell, Edwardian, p. 16.
[126] Frank Dikötter, 'Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics', The American Historical Review, 103, 1998, pp. 467-478; p. 468 and p. 476; Pope, War, pp. 58-59.
[127] Robb, British, pp. 7-8.
[128] Dikötter, 'Race', p. 476.
[129] Kennedy, Rise, p. 229.
[130] Fest, 'Jingoism', p. 175.
[131] Fest, 'Jingoism', p. 176.
[132] Powell, Edwardian, pp. 164-165; Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 32; Kennedy, Rise, p. 230.
[133] Hyam, Britain's, pp. 261-162 and p. 271.
[134] Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls, 'Preface', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. vii-viii; p. vii.
[135] Powell, Edwardian, p. 132.
[136] Summers, 'Character', p. 73.
[137] Robb, British, p. 5.
[138] Powell, Edwardian, p. 140.
[139] Zimmer, Nationalism, p. 5 and p. 25.
[140] Zimmer, Nationalism, p. 1 and p. 27.
[141] L.L. Farrar, Jr., 'Nationalism in Wartime: Critiquing the Conventional Wisdom', in Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee (eds.), Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), pp. 133-151; p. 133.
[142] Kennedy, Rise, p. 369.
143] Robb, British, p. 5.
[144] Clarke, 'Introduction', p. 1, pp. 13-15, p. 17 and p. 21; Kennedy, Rise, p. 376; Panikos Panayi, The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War, (Providence, R.I.:Berg Publishers, 1991); p. 36.
[145] Clarke, 'Introduction', p. 2 and pp. 13-15.
[146] Clarke, 'Introduction', p. 2.
[147] Clarke, 'Introduction', pp. 13-15; General Sir George Tomkyns Chesney, 'The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer', in I.F. Clarke (ed.), The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1995), pp. 27-73; p. 27.
[148] Clarke, 'Introduction', p. 21; Powell, Edwardian, p. 140; Hyam, Britain's, p. 262; Brown, Tommy, p. 15.
[149] Clarke, 'Introduction', pp. 13-15; Howard, 'Empire', p. 10.
[150] Summers, 'Character', p. 75.
[151] Clarke, 'Introduction', p. 8; Hilary and Dik Evans, 'Peter', p. 18 and p. 12.
[152] Hilary and Dik Evans, 'Peter', p. 18 and p. 12; Clarke, 'Introduction', p. 15; Kelly, Descent, pp. 4-5; Beaven, 'Provincial' p. 214; Kennedy, Rise, p. 361; Sanders and Taylor, British, p. 2.
[153] Beaven, 'Provincial', p. 208 and pp. 214-217.
[154] Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, (London: Vintage, 1994); p xiii.
[155] Rohe, 'British', pp. 130-131.
[156] Rohe, 'British', p. 132; Pope, War, p. 14; Zimmer, Nationalism, p. 37.
[157] Kennedy, Rise, p. 386; Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 18.
[158] Peter Wizen, 'Treitschke's Influence on the Rise of Imperialist and Anti-British Nationalism in Germany', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds.), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 154-170; pp. 156-158 and p. 161.
[159] David Stewart, James Fitzgerald and Alf Pickard, The Great War: Sources and Evidence, Second edition, (Melbourne: Nelson, 1995 [first edition 1987]); pp. 59-60 and 62.
[160] Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 28.
[161] Hyam, Britain's, pp. 230-231 and 257; Kennedy, Rise, p. 461.
[162] Powell, Edwardian, pp. 164-165.
[163] Andersen, Century, pp. 4-5.
[164] Robb, British, p. 8.
[165] Fest, 'Jingoism', p. 187; Panyani, Enemy, p. 153.
[166] Kennedy, Rise.
[167] Coetzee and Shevin-Coetzee, 'Introduction', p. viii.
[168] Hilary and Dik Evans, 'What's to come is still unsure', in Hilary and Dik Evans (eds.), Beyond the Gaslight: Science in Popular Fiction, 1895-1905, (London: Muller, 1976), pp. 152-160; p. 152.
[169] Andersen, Century, p. 16.
[170] Howard, 'Empire', p. 10.
[171] Howard, 'Empire', p. 10.
[172] Own Correspondent. Germany and the Boers. The Times, (Tuesday 11th December, 1900); p. 5; Panayi, Enemy, p. 30.
[173] Own Correspondent. Germany and England. The Times, (Friday 16th March, 1900); p. 5; Own Correspondent. Germany and Great Britain. The Times, (Saturday 28th April, 1900); p. 7.
[174] Own Correspondent. Germany and England. The Times, (Thursday 28th November, 1901); p. 5; Own Correspondent. Germany and England. The Times, (Thursday 16th January, 1902); p. 5.
[175] Own Correspondent. France, England, And Germany. The Times, (Monday 16th October, 1905); p. 3.
[176] Own Correspondent. France, England, And Germany. The Times, (Thursday 29th August, 1907); p. 3; Courtney of Penwith et al. Letters to the Editor: England and Germany. The Times, (Saturday 9th November, 1907); p. 4.
[177] Gregory, Last, p. 17.
[178] Own Correspondent. The Time for Intervention: Germany and the Course of the War. The Times, (Wednesday 30th October, 1912); p. 8.
[179] Stewart et al., Great, pp. 22-23.
[180] Ex-Staff Officer. Germany's Preparations for a War with England. Penny Illustrated Paper, (Saturday 20th January, 1912); p. 76; Author Unknown. Plain English. Penny Illustrated Paper, (Saturday 24th February, 1912); p. 227.
[181] Unknown Author. Until the Autumn of 1911. Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times, (Saturday 18th December, 1909); p. 403.
[182] Stewart et al., Great, pp. 22-23 and pp. 210-211.
[183] Norman Angell. The Menace of War: Dominance of Russia or Germany. Views of Mr. Norman Angell. The Times, (Saturday 1st August, 1914); p. 6.
[184] Angell. Menace, p. 6.
[185] Unknown Author. Scholars' Protest against War with Germany. The Times, (Saturday 1st August, 1914); p. 6.
[186] Unknown Author. War Declared. The Times, (Wednesday 5th August, 1914); p. 6.
[187] Gregory, Last, p. 23; Fest, 'Jingoism', p. 175; Pope, War, pp. 20-21.
[188] Gregory, Last, p. 10; Gerard J. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War, (London: Longman, 1996); p. 3.
[189] Berlin Correspondent. Why Germany Made War. The Times, (Tuesday 11th August, 1914); p. 5.
[190] Lord Sydenham. Six Months of War. The Times, (Thursday 4th February, 1915); p. 9.
[191] Military Correspondent. The War Day by Day. The Times, (Thursday 24th September, 1914); p. 5.
[192] Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 18 and 42.
[193] Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 42.
[194] Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 42; Hyam, Britain's, p. 203 and p. 262; Wilson, Myriad, p. 18 and p. 22.
[195] Stewart et al., Great, p. 28; Hyam, Britain's, p. 262 and p. 272.
[196] Stewart et al., Great, p. 20.
[197] Kennedy, Rise, p. 251.
[198] Own Correspondent. Causes of the War. The Times, (Saturday 19th September, 1914); p. 9.
[199] Unknown Author. British Determination to Win. The Times, (Tuesday 3rd August, 1915); p. 4.
[200] Unknown Author. Lord Kitchener's Statement. The Times, (Wednesday 19th May, 1915); p. 12.
[201] Gregory, Last, pp. 47-48; Unknown Author. Frightfulness. The Times, (Sunday 29th November, 1914); p. 3.
[202] Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 53; Stewart et al., Great, p. 26; Wawro, Warfare, p. 162 and p. 180.
[203] Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 33 and p. 57; Fest, 'Jingoism', p. 182.
[204] Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 52; Stewart et al., Great, p. 30; Fest, 'Jingoism' p. 179.
[205] Kennedy, Rise, p. 221 and p. 416; Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 52.
[206] Powell, Edwardian, p. 140; Stewart et al., Great, p. 31.
[207] Powell, Edwardian, p. 140; Stewart et al., Great, p. 31; Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 52.
[208] Powell, Edwardian, p. 140; Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 52 and p. 57; Fest, 'Jingoism', p. 179 and p. 182; Wawro, Warfare, p. 183.
[209] Hyam, Britain's, p. 265; Steiner and Neilson, Britain, p. 52; Stewart et al., Great, p. 31.
[210] Fest, 'Jingoism', p. 182.
[211] Lord Francis-Williams. (1968). Propaganda 1914-15. History of the 20th Century, 793-801; 794.
[212] Andersen, Century, p. 5 and p. 8; Francis-Williams. Propaganda, 793-794.
[213] Stewart et al, Great, pp. 210-211.
[214] Andersen, Century, pp. 4-5; Robb, British, p. 7.
[215] Robb, British, p. 7; Kevin Cramer, 'Review Article: A World of Enemies: New Perspectives on German Military Culture and the Origins of the First World War', Central European History, 39, 2006, pp. 270-298; p. 271; Stewart et al., Great, p. 214.
[216] Robb, British, p. 6.
[217] Z.A.B. Zeman. (1968). Propaganda and Subversion. History of the 20th Century, 802-808; 802; Andersen, Century, p. 9; J.M. Roberts. (1968). Introduction to The Home Fronts. History of the 20th Century, 785-812; 785; DeGroot, Blighty, pp. 175-176; Robb, British, p. 98; Wilson, Myriad, pp. 733-734 and p. 744.
[218] Pope, War, pp. 33-34.
[219] Unknown Author. Bombs at Namur. The Times, (Sunday 16th August, 1914); p. 1; Gregory, Last, p. 17; Military Correspondent. The War Day by Day. The Times, (Wednesday 17th February, 1915); p. 7.
[220] Sanders and Taylor, British, p. 28.
[221]Gregory, Last, pp. 47-48.
[222] Gregory, Last, p. 47.
[223] Gregory, Last, p. 57.
[224] Francis-Williams. Propaganda, 795; Gregory, Last, p. 17; Will Pinkney, 'C E Montague, Liberal War Writers and the Great War', The RUSI Journal, 155, 2010, pp. 82-86; pp. 82-83; Wilson, Myriad, p. 15.
[225] Gregory, Last, p. 44.
[226] Gregory, Last, p. 51; Stewart et al., Great, pp. 210-211.
[227] Unknown Author. Editorial/Leaders. The Times, (Monday 21st September, 1914); p. 9.
[228] Own Correspondent. German Atrocities. The Times, (Tuesday 3rd August, 1915); p. 4.
[229] A Correspondent. War Prisoners in Germany. The Times, (Wednesday 10th March, 1915); p. 9; Unknown Author. War Prisoners in Germany. The Times, (Monday 5th April, 1915); p. 5; Herbert Bury. British Prisoners Of War In Germany. The Times, (Monday 14th June, 1915); p. 7; Unknown Author. War Prisoners in Germany. The Times, (Thursday 11th March, 1915); p. 7.
[230] Gregory, Last, p. 46, 60 and 69; Unknown Author. The Sinking of the Lusitania. The Times, (Saturday 8th May, 1915); p. 9.
[231] Gregory, Last, p. 40, p. 46 and p. 62; Wilson, Myriad, p. 182.
[232] Medical Correspondent. The Poison Gas. The Times, (Saturday 1st May, 1915); p. 7.
[233] Gregory, Last, p. 40 and p. 69; Francis-Williams. Propaganda, 793; Malcolm Brown, The Imperial War Museum Book of the Western Front, (London: Pan Books, 2001); p. 77.
[234] Unknown Author. To-Day in Germany. The Times, (Wednesday 7th April, 1915); p. 7; Neutral Correspondent. In Germany To-Day. The Times, (Monday 31st May, 1915); p. 5.
[235] Pope, War, p. 91.
[236] Fest, 'Jingoism', p. 174; Jones, Social, p. 149; Summers, 'Character', p. 83; Panayi, Enemy, p. 7; Winter, Great, p. 15.
[237] Robb, British, pp. 9-10.
[238] Robb, British, p. 10.
[239] Robb, British, p. 9.
[240] Major De Breze Darnley Stewart-Stephens. Is England Full of German Spies? Penny Illustrated Paper, (Saturday 18th November, 1911); p. 652.
[241] Unknown Author. Enemy Aliens Among Us. The Times, (Monday 19th October, 1914); p. 9.
[242] Robb, British, p. 8; Panyani, Enemy, p. 27.
[243] Unknown Author. Aliens and Enemies. The Times, (Friday 23rd October, 1914); p. 9.
[244] Rochfort Maguire. Naturalized Germans. The Times, (Thursday 29th October, 1914); p. 10.
[245] Fest, 'Jingoism', p. 187; Pope, War, pp. 33-34; Unknown Author. Parliament: Conduct of the War. The Times, (Tuesday 13th July, 1915); p. 10; Stewart et al., Great, p. 214; Francis-Williams. Propaganda, 800; Unknown Author. Anger in the City. The Times, (Tuesday 11th May, 1915); p. 10; Parliamentary Correspondent. Germans in England. The Times, (Wednesday 12th May, 1915); p. 9; Unknown Author. London Disturbances. The Times, (Wednesday 12th May, 1915); p. 10; Parliamentary Correspondent. Anti-German Riots. The Times, (Thursday 13th May, 1915); p. 9; Panayi, Enemy, p. 223; Wilson, Myriad, p. 160 and p. 172.
[246] Wilson, Myriad, pp. 170-172 and 176.
[247] Unknown Author. Germans in England. The Times, (Tuesday 4th May, 1915); p. 9; Panyani, Enemy, p. 3; Unknown Author. Protest Meetings: Rioters in Court. The Times, (Friday 14th May, 1915); p. 10.
[248] Unknown Author. Enemy Aliens. The Times, (Friday 14th May, 1915); p. 9; Unknown Author. Protest Meetings: Rioters in Court. The Times, (Friday 14th May, 1915); p. 10.
[249] H.G. Wells. Playing the Enemy's Game. The Times, (Friday 14th May, 1915); p. 10.

[251] Zeman. Propaganda, 805.
[252] Gregory, Last, p. 7; Unknown Author. Alien Enemies: Clearance Order at Brighton. The Times, (Wednesday 21st October, 1914); p. 5.

[254] Unknown Author. German Barbarities: Punishment After the War. The Times, (Saturday 15th May, 1915); p. 5.
[255] Schmitt, Theory, p. 6.
[256] Brown, Tommy, p. 9; John Horne, 'Soldiers, Civilians and the Warfare of Attrition: Representations of Combat in France, 1914-1918', in Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin-Coetzee (eds.), Authority, Identity and the Social History of the Great War, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995), pp. 223-249; pp. 224-225; Stewart et al., Great, p. 57; Gregory, Last, p. 19; Andersen, Century, p. 14.
[257] Brown, Tommy, p. 9.
[258] Brown, Tommy, p. 15.
[259] Brown, Tommy, p. 13.
[260] Winter, Great, p. 30; Wilson, Myriad, p. 243.
[261] Brown, Tommy, pp. 10-12 and 14; Max Arthur, Forgotten Voices in association with the Imperial War Museum, (London: Ebury Press, 2003); p. 9; Gregory, Last, p. 31 and pp. 73-74; Winter, Great, p. 294; Wilson, Myriad, p. 37 and p. 243.
[262] Brown, Tommy, p. 14; Arthur, Forgotten, p. 16, p. 18, p. 65 and pp. 91-92; Wilson, Myriad, p. 707.
[263] Brown, Tommy, pp. 10-11.
[264] Pope, War, p. 3; Winter, Great, p. 27.
[265] Brown, Tommy, p. 67; Arthur, Forgotten, p. 6 and p. 61; Gregory, Last, p. 133; Brown, Imperial, p. xvii.
[266] Gregory, Last, p. 134; Robert L. Nelson, 'Soldier Newspapers: A Useful Source in the Social and Cultural History of the First World War and Beyond', War in History, 17, 2010, pp. 167-191; p. 168.
[267] Horne, 'Soldiers', pp. 224-225.
[268] Brown, Tommy, p. 65; Coetzee and Shevin-Coetzee, 'Introduction', p. viii; Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare, (New York: Basic Books, 1999); p. xviii; John B. Nicholson. (1915). The Great War Archive: John B. Nicholson's Letter Home. Retrieved September 17, 2011, from http://www.oucs.ox.ac.uk/ww1lit/gwa/item/5674?CISOBOX=1&REC=2; Brown, Imperial, p. xvii and pp. 20-21 and p. 60.
[269] Gregory, Last, p. 1; Bourke, Intimate, p. 136.
[270] Arthur, Forgotten, pp. 55-56.
[271] Arthur, Tommy, pp. 56-57.
[272] Arthur, Forgotten, pp. 57-58.
[273] Brown, Imperial, pp. 53-54; Various Authors. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Friday 1st January, 1915); p. 3; Wilson, Myriad, pp. 69-70.
[274] Arthur, Forgotten, p. 58; Wilson, Myriad, p. 70.
[275] Territorial Officer. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Wednesday 20th January, 1915); p. 6; Artillery Officer. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Thursday 28th January, 1915); p. 4.
[276] Bourke, Intimate, p. 136 and 144; Brown, Imperial, p. 13, p. 15, p. 79 and p. 264.
[277] Officer of the R.A.M.C. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Friday 27th November, 1914); p. 6; Brown, Tommy, p. 72.
[278] Brown, Tommy, p. 72; Officer in the R.H.A. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Thursday 3rd December, 1914); p. 6.
[279] Brown, Tommy, p. 89; Bourke, Intimate, p. 135.
[280] Brown, Tommy, p. 91; Arthur, Forgotten, pp. 27-28; Bourke, Intimate, p. 19 and p. 128; Brown, Imperial, p. 10, p. 37 and p. 79.
[281] Unknown Authors. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Friday 27th November, 1914); p. 6.
[282] Private W. Jackson. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Saturday 28th November, 1914); p. 6.
[283] Officer of the East Lancashires. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Monday 30th November, 1914); p. 6.
[284] Brown, Tommy, p. 91.
[285] Bourke, Intimate, p. xvii.
[286] T.C. O'Donnell. (1915). Firstworldwar.com: Memoirs & Diaries: The Retreat from Mons and the Battle of Loos. Retrieved September 17, 2011, from http://www.firstworldwar.com/diaries/monsandloos.htm; Zeman. Propaganda, 806.
[287] Bourke, Intimate, pp. 18-19 and p. 49.
[288] Brown, Imperial, p. 49.
[289] Unknown Author. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Thursday 3rd December, 1914); p. 6.
[290] Brown, Tommy, pp. 91-92; Brown, Imperial, pp. 335-336.
[291] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, p. 30.
[292] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, pp. 30-31.
[293] A Correspondent. War Prisoners in Germany. The Times, (Wednesday 10th March, 1915); p. 9; Unknown Author. War Prisoners in Germany. The Times, (Monday 5th April, 1915); p. 5; Herbert Bury. British Prisoners Of War In Germany. The Times, (Monday 14th June, 1915); p. 7.
[294] Arthur, Forgotten, p. 53.
[295] Arthur, Forgotten, pp. 71-73.
[296] Arthur, Forgotten, p. 35.
[297] Brown, Imperial, p. 167.
[298] Gregory, Last, p. 283; Brown, Imperial, p. 157.
[299] Arthur, Forgotten, p. 89; Brown, Imperial, p. 173.
[300] Brown, Imperial, p. 25 and 194; Wilson, Myriad, p. 245 and p. 249.
[301] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, p. 31.
[302] Brown, Tommy, p. 164.
[303] Pope, War, p. 2.
[304] Brown, Tommy, p. 12.
[305] Brown, Tommy, p. 164.
[306] Brown, Imperial, p. 248; Unknown Author. British Troops and Poison Gas. The Times, (Saturday 15th May, 1915); p. 8; Wilson, Myriad, p. 127.
[307] Major H. Page Croft, M.P. A Cabinet of the Race. The Times, (Saturday 15th May, 1915); p. 5.
[308] Brown, Imperial, p. 77.
[309] Brown, Imperial, p. 77 and pp. 82-83.
[310] Brown, Tommy, p. 165; Arthur, Forgotten, p. 61.
[311] An Officer. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Thursday 25th March, 1915); p. 4.
[312] Brown, Imperial, p. 109.
[313] Arthur, Forgotten, pp. 92-93.
[314] Arthur, Forgotten, pp. 92-93; Bourke, Intimate, p. 144; John B. Nicholson. (1915). The Great War Archive: John B. Nicholson's Letter Home. Retrieved September 17, 2011, from http://www.oucs.ox.ac.uk/ww1lit/gwa/item/5674?CISOBOX=1&REC=2; Infantry Officer. Letters from the Front. The Times, (Monday 22nd March, 1915); p. 7.
[315] Brown, Tommy, p. 212.
[316] Brown, Tommy, p. 72.
[317] Bourke, Intimate, p. 155.
[318] Brown, Tommy, p. 90.
[319] Brown, Tommy, p. 91.
[320] Brown, Tommy, p. 72 and p. 89.
[321] Brown, Tommy, p. 51.
[322] Nelson, 'Soldier', p. 183.
[323] Brown, Imperial, p. 103; Winter, Great, p. 285.
[324] Winter, Great, pp. 285-286.
[325] Bourke, Intimate, pp. 148-149.
[326] Andersen, Century, pp. 14-15.
[327] Andersen, Century, pp. 12-13; Francis-Williams. Propaganda, 796-800; Sanders and Taylor, British, p. 24; Wilson, Myriad, p. 678.
[328] Farrar, Jr., 'Nationalism', p. 135.
[329] Bourke, Intimate, p. xix.
[330] Brown, Imperial, p. 250.
[331] Andersen, Century, p. 6.
[332] Bourke, Intimate, p. 61.
[333] Nelson, 'Soldier', p. 183.
[334] Schmitt, Theory, p. 35.
[335] Hyam, Britain's, p. 75.
[336] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, p. 30.
[337] Gregory, Last, p. 296.
[338] Gregory, Last, p. 6.
[339] Bartov, Murder; Coetzee and Shevin-Coetzee, 'Introduction', p. viii.
[340] Bartov, Murder, p. 3, p. 23, p. 26 and p. 89; Cramer, 'Review', p. 278.
[341] Bartov, Murder, p. 16.
[342] Bartov, Murder, p. 20 and pp. 34-35.
[343] Bartov, Murder, p. 20.
[344] Bartov, Murder, p. 34.
[345] Benjamin Madley, 'From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe', European History Quarterly, 35, 2005, pp. 429-464; Cramer, 'Review', pp. 277-278.
[346] Sarah J. Purcell, 'Review Article: War, Memory and National Identity in the Twentieth Century', National Identities, 2, 2000, pp. 187-195; pp. 188-189.
[347] Zimmer, Nationalism, p. 43.
[348] Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, p. 226.
[349] Said, Orientalism, p. xviii.
[350] Howard, 'Empire', p. 10.
[351] Howard, 'Empire', p. 10.
[352] Cramer, 'Review', p. 274.

Back to top