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Lessons That Should Have Been Learned By The British From The Western Front In The Great War

Introduction
Today, after every disaster the British general public is always earnestly assured that "Lessons have been learned" and "Appropriate changes will be made to prevent a reoccurrence in future".

It is perhaps informative, therefore, to look back and take a broad look at the events on the Western Front in the Great War, and to reflect on what these 'lessons to be learned were'. Then, go on to consider what remedial action might have been indicated, if this same cult of self-examination and critique had thrived in the second decade of the 20^th Century.

Declaration of War:

• Wars in foreign lands should only be declared if there are adequate cadres of well trained officers and men, and appropriate quantities of up-to-date arms and munitions, to fight a lengthy war against all the countries of the putative enemy alliance. However, a purely defensive war of the homeland and/or British territories overseas, would have entirely different justifications, objectives and imperatives.
• Except in the most extreme emergency, war should only be declared by an act of the British Parliament after due debate by the people's representatives in Parliament, irrespective of the expressed wishes of the Administration or the Crown.
• It should always be assumed that wars usually last much longer, and cover more territory, than first imagined. The "Over by Christmas" scenario is usually false.

Recruitment for War:

• Patriotism should only be used as a 'recruiting sergeant' when the national needs fully justify it, and provided that the war has the support of the majority of a well-informed public.
• Conscription should not be delayed if the operational needs of military, or civilian, personnel require it to be implemented quickly and so effectively prosecute the war.
• Creation of military units should not be authorised when the men involved are exclusively drawn from one particular group of the population, be it based on, say, geographical area, occupation, non-military profession or sport .

Preparations for War:

• Fighting servicemen should be provided with the highest possible standard of equipment that is available, or that can be acquired. Equipment also requires a continuously ongoing evaluation to ensure its efficacy in the field, and any modifications that are needed must be made expeditiously and efficaciously.
• The anonymity of the fighting serviceman, on and off the battlefield, should be reduced by providing him with a distinctive uniform, or insignia, which clearly distinguishes the front-line serviceman from the support troops who operate away from the battlefield and its particular dangers.
• As far as is possible operationally, differences in uniform or accoutrements that readily identify officers and senior other ranks to the enemy on the battlefield should be eliminated.
• Operations Staff Officers should be made fully aware of the limits of human endurance in the actual theatre of war at any time, and should be updated regularly as conditions change. The opinions of Regimental commanders should be listened to and given proper consideration. Rotations and redeployments on the battlefield must be as frequent as is required to maintain the morale and physical and mental welfare of the servicemen. Rotation and deployment should be based on a transparent and equitable system.

Appointments:

• Army Staff Officers should be exclusively selected from fit and active cadres: the Staff Officers concerned with the planning and execution of Operations must always include significant numbers of officers who have had recent service on the battlefield. Rotation of the Operations Staff Officers between HQ and the field is to be encouraged as standard practice

Deployment:

• The intention to deploy servicemen against the enemy must be disguised until the very last moment, and no overt action taken which might indicate to the enemy even the possibility of an attack in the sector concerned.

• Once an attack is seen to have failed, and all elements of surprise have been lost, it is nearly always futile to continue sending in fresh troops day after day, or even week after week and month after month. To do so is usually simply to reinforce failure. Any attempt to do this should be regarded as intentional attrition of both sides and regarded as an act of supreme negligence.
• Front line troops must be deployed at the lowest density commensurate with holding that particular part of the front-line. The efficacy of these front-line troops should be enhanced by the highest possible level of support by infrastructure, weaponry, munitions and artillery and aircraft, i.e. whenever possible servicemen should be replaced, or supplemented, by machines.

• Tactical positions must not be held on to for inappropriate reasons. It is better to retreat to sustainable defences rather than struggle on at great cost to hang on to untenable strong points and territory. Salients and vulnerable 'pockets' must be rapidly eliminated; even by withdrawals if this is the less costly long-term option in terms of casualties.
• Commanding officers must be made aware that the men and material under their command are a limited and scarce resource that must be expended with the greatest of care and consideration. Officers who are careless with these resources must be ruthlessly removed from command.
• Declarations by commanders of "To be held at all costs" are to be avoided. Better to rationalise the dispositions to avoid the unnecessary sacrifice of isolated and demoralised troops.
• The location of defences must be made with a clear understanding of their sustainability and/or vulnerability. Poor defences must be ruthlessly relocated to reduce any advantage that the enemy may have over them from the lie of the terrain etc.

Technological advances:

• Any potential improvement in materiel, munitions, strategy or tactics should be carefully husbanded and only launched onto the battlefield when conditions are propitiously and on a scale that is likely to cause the enemy the most serious and enduring set-back. The serviceman involved in all aspects of its deployment must be adequately trained to ensure that the new technology is deployed at its maximum efficacy.

• Any technical improvement introduced by the enemy must be neutralised or countered as urgently and efficacious as possible, using all the means that are available or can be acquired.

Awards:

• Award of medals for gallantry must be exclusively restricted to the fighting serviceman. However, when appropriate, the award of these medals by ballot amongst the fighting men involved in a joint act of gallantry should be strongly supported as this is generally seen to be both fair and just.

Medical care:

• The industrialisation of modern war produces casualties on an unprecedented scale and duration. Every serviceman must be confident that competent medical care is available at close hand. Thus the objective of the military Health Services must be to locate the highest level of medical care as close as possible to the battlefield and to ensure safe and prompt evacuation of casualties where this needed.

Conclusion
Whether these lessons errors of omission and commission in the Great War have been learned and rectified in later wars of the 20th and 21^st Century is a moot point and debatable. But if unacceptable levels of casualties are to be avoided in current and future wars, and the battlefield troops are to be fairly treated, the adoption of appropriate remedial practice from lessons learned in earlier wars is essential at both the command level and on the battlefield.

Postscriptum
In the above, the servicewoman is not mentioned as they did not serve in active service units in the Great War. Obviously, all the remedial actions described would equally apply to the servicewoman where applicable in the armed forces of the 21^st Century.

Acknowledgements
This article was inspired by one that appeared in the WFA journal Stand To! No. 81, entitled On a Change of Mentality – the Post War Thoughts of Percy Stone – a Great War, Western Front veteran – authored by Ronald Cuxford. This author would like to make it clear that the views expressed here are entirely his and are not necessarily those of the Western Front Association, or anyone else.