Introduction
When the Great War began for the British Empire on the 4th of August, 1914 the British Army was, compared to its major Allies (France and Russia) and its principal enemies (Germany and Austro-Hungary), very small indeed; it was often somewhat pejoratively called 'Britain's colonial police-force'. It had a total strength of only 11 divisions (250,000 men - one-third posted to India). Traditionally, the country and Empire depended upon the Royal Navy for its main line of defence and, accordingly, the Royal Navy had always received the lion's-share of the defence budget.
The standing British Army in 1914 was entirely made up of well-trained and highly disciplined professional soldiers. However, it was backed by a Army Reserve of around 200,000 former soldiers and a volunteer militia called the Territorial Force, 270,000 strong, and comprised of 14 brigades of yeomanry cavalry and 14 divisions of infantry. But these Territorial soldiers were only committed to serve in the United Kingdom, and a mere 7% of them were said to be willing to serve overseas.
Most of the countries of the British Empire also had their own volunteer military forces; some supported by rotating British Army regiments. Almost all these Empire volunteer armies had a similar limitation restricting their employment to within their own countries.
At least as far as France and Belgium were concerned, it was fully expected that the British would rush to their aid if, and, when Germany attacked either of them, as it did on the 1st of August 1914. Largely to serve its own interests, and after some heated debate, the British rapidly formed five of the regular Army divisions (four infantry and one cavalry, 100,000 men) into the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and sent it to support France and Belgium on the Western Front.
The BEF arrives in Europe
The BEF disembarked at Le Havre in France on the 5th of August 1914 and quickly moved to the Front. A contribution that was welcomed by the Allies but thought somewhat inadequate for a leading power like Britain with its vast resources of Empire. It was promptly dubbed by Germany's leader, Kaiser Wilhelm II, 'a contemptible little army'.
Although the soldiers of the BEF were well trained with a deep understanding of the field craft of war, the BEF was woefully weak in firepower. It had too few machine-guns, no high-explosive shells at all (only shrapnel shells), and was critically short of heavy artillery and all kinds of ammunition. Critically, in view of the looming onset of trench warfare, it also lacked a reliable hand-grenade.
Once the BEF became involved the large-scale fighting on the Western Front, it became quickly obvious to the more sagacious British generals, and the British Government at large, that extremely large numbers of additional troops would be required if the war was to be prosecuted to a successful conclusion.
Reserves and volunteers
The only immediate source of these additional fighting-men was the existing Army Reserve - where former officer and soldier reservists were available for recall in the event of hostilities - and volunteers from the Territorial Force. An immediate campaign of action was undertaken taken to recall the Reservists to active duty and encourage as many as possible of the Territorials to volunteer for overseas service 'for the duration of the War'. This produced an immediate boost of relatively well-trained manpower but many of these Reservists and Territorials were hardly fit for service at the operational level and required refresher training. Moreover, it was quickly apparent that this inflow, whilst useful, would not be, by any means, sufficient to provide the foreseen numbers of men.
On the 5th August 1914, a British Army Field Marshal of renown - Lord Kitchener - had been made the Secretary of War and given the immediate task of raising a new volunteer army of 100,000, with more to follow. A country campaign was launched for volunteers from civilian life to 'serve for the duration'. Many young British men were already primed with the patriotic fervour that had developed during the run up to the Declaration of War. Added to this were the often somewhat exaggerated reports of the ruthless nature of the German Army's advance across France and Belgium, the encouragement of relatives, and the peer pressure from friends and girl friends.
Huge numbers of volunteers, from all walks of civilian life, besieged Army recruiting centres and town halls. Such was the huge response to General Kitchener's call, that many volunteers were enlisted and then left in limbo to await induction into the newly created army service battalions proper, when they could be housed, equipped, fed and supplied with weapons essential for their training.
By December 1914, after enormous effort, 1 million volunteers had been enlisted. Although an inevitable tapering off in the numbers of volunteers began in October 1914, it was still at a monthly level of 20,000 in early 1915.
Apart from the severe shortages of all kinds of martial equipment and weapons of all kinds, the principal bottleneck during this early period was the chronic shortfall of experienced officers (there were only 1,000 British general staff in-service in August 1914) and senior NCO's. These were the executives who were required to organise and train this vast New Army, which was of a size quite without precedence in the history of the British Army.
The European armies mobilise
Whilst the British struggled to organise, equip and train their volunteer army, the other European armies were generally in a much better position. Pre-1914, most European countries had a system of conscription whereby all males were required to register for National Service on their 18th birthday. Thereafter, they were subject to compulsory conscription into the army for one, or more, years of intensive military training. This completed, they were placed on the Army Reserve and subject to periodic training and recall to active service in the event of hostilities.
To facilitate mobilisation, most European countries had developed a sophisticated and highly rehearsed system of transportation to collect and deliver their armies to the Front, within, or outside, the boundaries of the country. In particular, the existing rail systems were widely developed for this purpose.
In 1914, both Germany and France had 4 million troops ready for mobilisation; Austro-Hungary had 3 million and Russia 6 million. Large numbers of these men were in the field within a matter of days.
Conscription
Towards the end of 1915, it became evident to the British government that the numbers of volunteers was falling, with little prospect of any radical improvement. Moreover, casualties on the Western Front were soaring to quite unanticipated levels.
By December 1915, Britain had suffered 500,000 casualties (equivalent to 500 infantry battalions), with 200,000 killed or wounded. Even worse, in the same period, France had incurred an incredible 2 million casualties and 1 million killed or missing. A huge deficit in manpower was looming. If Britain was to play anything more than a minor role on the Western Front, both military manpower and the production of material for war had to be greatly increased.
Unlike its European neighbours, Britain (and the Empire) had always shunned the concept of conscription and, in fact, pre-Great War it had not found great difficulty in finding sufficient volunteer recruits for its military manpower requirements. (In 1912, the British anti-conscription 'National Service League' was formed).
Towards the end of 1915, as an interim measure just short of conscription, the government created yet another voluntary scheme of recruitment under aegis of Lord Derby. This required all adult, males of 40 years of age, and below, to enlist voluntarily, or register their willingness to serve if required. This produced another 200,000 enlistments and 2 million registrations.
At the same time women were finally positively encouraged to come forward to volunteer their services in various non-combattant military roles and the public services. There was also an increasing policy trend towards the active recruitment of women into jobs formerly restricted to men, thus releasing these men for military service.
In January 1916, it was realised that over 600,000 of eligible men had failed to 'volunteer to offer their services', and seemed unlikely to do so voluntarily. So, the conscription bullet was finally bitten in Britain, and it was formally instituted in January 1916 under the Military Service Act. Using the same age criteria as the Lord Derby Scheme, it was intended only for physically able, single, men. Subsequently, married men were also conscripted.
Six months after the introduction of military conscription in Britain, large new drafts of men had filtered into the Western Front and began to match the outflow of casualties - 400 on a 'normal' day. Indeed, the manpower situation became so favourable that it permitted the formation, in the Somme Sector, of the ill-fated Fourth Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Henry Rawlinson.
Once established in Britain, conscription continued throughout the remaining period of the War. It was also introduced into most of the Empire countries - but not in Australia.
Final manpower shortages
Perhaps, the most critical manpower shortages of the war occurred in early 1918, when, post-Passchendaele, the British Army was suffering not only a lowering of morale but also a reduction of infantry strength to less than 500,000 compared with over 600,000 six months earlier. Also, there had been a notable decline in the quality of the new recruits and there were increasing numbers of 18 year olds in the replacement drafts reaching the Front. From April 1918 onwards a new Military Service Act raised the conscription age to 50 years of age.
To add to these manpower problems, at the request of the French, the British again extended their Front southwards by another 42 miles, thus further enfeebling their defence lines. They also endeavoured to introduce a new defensive battlefield philosophy of 'defence in depth' which required extensive remodelling of the existing trench-lines. The implemetation of this new system of defence met with some resistance, and a lack of comprehension, by some units that only added to the general lowering of operational efficacy.
Nevertheless, when the juggernaut of the German Michael Offensive struck in the Peronne Sector on the 21st March 1918, and the British army reeled into a wide fighting retreat, it was largely the dogged resistance of the British and Empire troops, in combination the over-extention and wavering discipline of the Germans, that eventually brought the offensive to a halt.
From this watershed of ill-fortune came the final denouement, with the Allied armies sweeping the Germans into a retreat towards their homeland and an eventual demand for an Armistice. On the eleventh hour, of the eleventh day, of the eleventh month of 1918, the fighting ceased. Finally, the British Army had come through all its travails and, in an unprecedented, and largely unsung string of late victories, had defeated, in concert with its Allies, the seemingly all conquering German Army.
Postscriptum
A total of around 2.5 million British volunteers and 2.2 million British conscripts, served in the Great War; an impressive 22% of those potentially eligible to serve.
