Firstly, the German Army did not want to attack Verdun because they thought that Verdun was a military threat to them! Verdun was a salient jutting out from our lines, Verdun was without good communications and Verdun was bisected by a river (the Meuse) with poor connections across it.
Verdun could not be used as a base for an offensive; an army gains no advantage from attacking from a salient. As Hindenberg and Ludendorf would discover later in the war at Amiens and Chateau-Thierry.
Equally, 'to bleed white' the French Army was not a plausible and appropriate objective at this time. To only want to exploit us by striking at a national icon, a possession so significant that every one knew we were bound to defend it at all costs would be to risk destroying oneself in the process. At this juncture in the war, our Allies were preparing to return to the fray (Russia had the potential for men and the British for materiel ) and this gave us hope that we would still have the last word.
Indubitably, we lacked the unity of command to properly coordinate and deploy our joint resources, but Falkenhayn knew about the common bond sealed by the meetings at Chantilly and Paris. A long drawn out battle of attrition would bring us even closer and give us the time to clarify our agreements and give mutual aid.
Falkenhayn's aspirations were certainly greater than he was willing to admit later in writing. I bear enough respect for our German adversaries, from the viewpoint of the mastery of military science, to be convinced that in their various endeavours their plans were always based on good and serious premises.
Accordingly, I think that General von Falkenhayn, by choosing Verdun, planned a truly great blow by crushing our lines by artillery fire and infantry attacks to ensure the fall of the town of Verdun.
By drawing our reserves to the Right Bank (of the Meuse), with the river at their back, he (Falkenhayn) knew we should be unable to withdraw or troops in good time. Then by undertaking a rapid incursion on the Left Bank, he foresaw that he could ensnare the French Army: a cull of the proportions of a new Sedan.
He hoped through these initiatives to open an immense breach in the French Army, and then to exploit this success by cutting it into two parts, giving the German armies every prospect of a stunning victory.
The Crown Prince proclaimed in a statement of 12th February …. "Let us (Germans) fully understand that the Fatherland has an extraordinary destiny in store for us". "We must prove to the enemy that our iron will of striving towards victory has long been with us and that where the German Army ventures all obstacles are overcome".
Don't such words make it clear what the German objectives really were from the start? These expectations, in a manner to be anticipated of the successors to Schlieffen, were justified by the brilliant results obtained on the Eastern Front. The Germans might think that the fighting would be more problematic with the French, but their pride in their innate superiority justified the pursuing of such goals.
Perhaps, we will never know the real agenda of Falkenhayn. Therefore, those intentions we suppose he did have, reflect more glory on him than any contrived list of possible objectives he might have had.
It will be said, and I accept this honesty with due respect, that the Crown Prince also put forward ideas which benefited from hindsight. But I do not think so. His memoirs carry the imprimatur of soldierly sincerity that honestly set out, in the simplest of terms, his personal feelings about his lost hopes and disappointments.
Contrary to the ideas put forward by Falkenhayn, the Crown Prince, who had the overall responsibility for preparations for, and the execution of, the initiatives against Verdun, did not like the 'skimped plan' of Falkenhayn; as he states in his memories.
In the eyes of the German Army, it did not have the option of a second chance in the attack on Verdun. The Army could succeed there by reviving with even more ardour and dash the tactics of 1914 Plan. Starting on both banks of the Meuse, the fortified camp of Verdun would be enveloped, cutting off all hope of reinforcement, and rendering it indefensible.
A Second Battle of the Marne would not cause a debacle, as did the First in August 1914. The German success in this battle was due to the Germans having already got a hold on the Top-of -Meuse, as well as St. Mihiel and the left bank of the of the Rhine.
General von Mudra, commanding, under the Crown Prince, the 6th Corps in Argonne, had long studied the various aspects of this problem. He commanded Metz before the War and he belonged to 5th Army in September 1914, when it attempted to invest Verdun from the west. Better than anyone, he knew the priceless importance of the positions on the West Bank of the Meuse for both the defence and for an attack on the fortifications of Verdun.
According to the records of several interviews with von Mudra, he complied fully with the aims and objectives of his chief (Falkenhayn) and, in his view, the advance of the Germans towards the south between Meuse and Argonne would irremediably compromise the situation of the French.
The Crown Prince and von Mudra both clearly saw the situation. Because of the lack of communications in this sector of the front line we could not hold onto the Right Bank of the Meuse if the 5th German Army succeeded at Verdun.
The fall of Verdun would enable the Germans to seriously threaten the main supply road between Bar-le-Duc and Verdun. Thus the French would be forced to precipitately fall back on a makeshift front line from Argonne to St. Mihiel. Such a fall back, with the immediate loss of Verdun, would incur extremely difficult moral consequences because the world was unaware that Verdun did not have the same value as a fortified camp anymore and the giving up of it would be interpreted as a serious loss to us.
Perhaps we shall never know the real objectives of Falkenhayn; but those that we assume were intended to bring him reflected glory might have just been part of a smoke screen to cover up his failures. The goals I describe as belonging possibly to Von Falkenhayn (a decisive blow by "trapping" French reserves on the right bank of the Meuse) would make him a smarter strategist (a la Von Schlieffen) than those he assumed later ("bleeding white" argument), may be to cover up his failure.
This is a translation of some of Petain's own writings on the subject of General von Falkenhayn, taken from his book "Verdun".
Petain was very much a 19th Century man and wrote like one using 19th Century French. This article was translated into modern French and then into English.
Translation by Marc Patiou and Dr. David Payne
