The Western Front Association: furthering interest in the Great War 1914-18 | explore | learn | share

The European 'Crusaders' of the Great War. IntroductionAfter over a decade of talk about the inevitability of a European War, in August 1914 five major European nations finally went to war on the Western and Eastern Fronts. All fervently believing they were pursuing a God-given, -blessed right to wage war on the enemy states to assert their rights over territory and people, and to curb a lust for power by their rivals. The five nations were: France, Russia and Britain (The Entente Powers), Germany and Austria-Hungary (The Central Powers). This supposedly short, sharp, war ('Over by Christmas' for the British, or 'Before the leaves fall' for the Germans) escalated into an unprecedented world war of 52 months duration. It eventually involved 57 nations, embroiling men and women from the continents of Africa, America, Asia, Australia and Europe. It produced a death toll in the Western Zone alone of over 8 million soldiers. So what was the genesis of this catastrophe between these five nations, and who and what were the motivators of it? FranceSince May 1871, the French nation had nursed a collective grievance about the départements of Alsace and (a large part of) Lorraine which had been ignominiously lost to Germany when The German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck signed the agreement to this effect at the conclusion of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. The territories were only recovered from the Germans through huge reparations payments, equivalent to £200 million - an immense sum at that time. The French slogan concerning the loss of this territory was 'Think of it always, speak of it never', and it registered deeply in the psyche of many French men and women. The French also firmly believed that the other Entente Powers - Russia and Britain - would come to their aid if Germany again invaded their territory, as it so ruthlessly did in 1870. GermanyWhereas the French were mainly concerned about the protection and retention of their territory - by European standards it was large and very productive for its size of population - the Germans fretted about several matters of great concern. Firstly, there was the matter of the relative size and power of their Navy vis-à-vis that of Britain. Secondly, there was German angst, jealousy and frustration over the relative paucity of their overseas colonies, when compared with other European nations. And thirdly, their country's general lack of influence around the world in comparison with its actual and potential industrial might. Some influential individuals even spoke freely of Germany's need for 'A struggle for world power'. At the pinnacle of power in Germany in 1914 was the Kaiser - Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany, who was not only physically disadvantaged with an obviously withered right arm, but he also suffered from a deeply insecure personality. Perhaps even more significantly, he had an unhealthy preoccupation with military trappings and ceremony and power politics. He also allowed his Prussian military caste of senior officers extraordinary influence in the day-to-day administration of the country, and encouraged their experiments with the rapid mobilisation and the training of his huge conscript army of over 3 million men to the highest standards. It was he who made the disastrous selection of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke 'The Younger', as the German Chief of Staff. Von Molkte subsequently made the fatal alterations to the Schlieffen Plan for the invasion of France that quite possibly lost Germany the war. Perhaps the oddest situation that the Kaiser created, just prior to WW1, was the estrangement between himself and his cousin, the British monarch, King George V, and the open enmity he showed another cousin, Nicholas II, the Tsar of Russia. Neither attitude was likely to benefit his cause. BritainOf all the five nations, Britain was the least prepared for a continental land war. Whilst the Royal Navy was as strong and dominant as ever, the Standing Army was relatively small - 250,000 men (Germany's was nearer 700,000) - many of which were scattered across the globe on colonial duty. There was no huge conscript army, only the volunteer Territorial Force of whom the majority were not eligible for duty overseas. Any plans for a rapid, large-scale mobilisation were, at best, rather tenuous. Except, of course, for the Royal Navy which was mobilised with great foresight by the Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, on the 2nd August 1914. Furthermore, the government did not foresee for itself a clear-cut role in the matter of the continentals' squabbles, and quite expected to be able to stand aside and let them get on with it. This reluctance to get involved was backed by a vociferous public campaign of pacifism led by many leading British intellectuals; prominent among which were the Socialists. Of course, this was not the viewpoint of France. It fully expected the British to keep to their 'understanding' inherent in the Entente Cordiale and come to the aid of France if it was attacked. However, Britain did not go to war when Russia, Germany and France mobilised and declared war on the Central Powers on 1st August 1914. It was only when Germany violated the neutrality of Belgium, in its advance cross-country to invade France, that the British felt obliged to declare war on Germany. This took place at 10pm on the 4th August 1914. Even so, it was only the mobilised state of the Royal Navy that permitted the British to begin the transportation of its limited contribution of five divisions (four infantry and one cavalry - 50,000 men) to France on the 12th August 1915. Austria-HungaryIn the first and second decade of the 1900's, the Balkans had been considered, with good reason, to be the 'tinder-box of Europe', ready at any moment to explode into war. Primarily, it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (a union of the Austrian and Hungarian monarchies ruling many of the Balkan nations) to crush the ever increasingly powerful Serbian nation once and for all. This situation was further complicated by a Russian guarantee to support the Serbs if it indeed came to war, and Germany's open support for Austria. In continental terms the two national armies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the 'Common Army', numbering 3 million men, were poorly trained and for years had been routinely starved of supplies. Apart from the Austrians, most of the troops were destined to serve on the Balkan, Italian and Eastern Fronts. On the 28th June 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir apparent, was assassinated in the streets of Sarajevo by a Serb Nationalist. Incensed, the Austrian-Hungarians considered punitive action against Serbia. By the 21st July 1914, the terms of an ultimatum to Serbia had been agreed to by the Austrian Council of Ministers and the Emperor, Franz Joseph, and on the 23rd it was delivered to Belgrade, the Serbian capital. It had a 48-hour deadline. Serbia began to mobilise its conscript army on the 25th July 1914, but simultaneously sent out what was considered by most other nations, including the Germans, as a conciliatory, perhaps even humiliating, response to the Austrian ultimatum. The other nations looked on in tense anticipation, pressing Austria to accept Serbia's apology and promises of restitution. Nevertheless, Austria declared war on Serbia, confident of the support of Germany, if the need arose. The juggernaut that was to become the First World War was set rolling. With Serbia in a state of war with Austria-Hungary, the four other Great Powers - France, Germany, Russia and Britain - hastened to consider their position, but they lacked any firm collective resolution to try to solve the problem peacefully. In a private conversation with King George V, the Kaiser got a commitment that Britain would remain neutral, but, in behind-the-scenes discussions, he wanted the freedom to take over some, or all, of France's overseas colonies. A step that he must have known the British would never agree. Russia mobilised its army of six million men on the 29th July 1914 and, along with France, tried to pressure Britain into an Anglo-Franco-Russian Alliance. Meanwhile, the Tsar tried to intercede personally with the Kaiser, cancelling full mobilisation as a sign of good faith. Everything now seemed to rest on Serbia agreeing to submit to jurisdiction at the International Court at the Hague. It was all to no avail. The Russians resumed their mobilisation, declaring support for Serbia. France began the mobilisation of its four million troops, but hesitated to declare war on Germany. Crucially, Britain then asked both France and Germany to guarantee the neutrality, and borders, of Belgium, with whom the British did have such a Treaty obligation. The French agreed with alacrity but the Germans did not reply. On 1st August 1914 the Kaiser ordered the mobilisation of the German Army - 4.5 million men - and after some vacillation, and attempts at further compromises with the various Powers, declared war on Russia. He was caught in the dilemma of the dictates of the two-war front as outlined in the von Schlieffen Plan, and reacted accordingly. The next day German patrols entered French territory and, on the 3rd August 1914, Germany formally declared war on France moving its troops over the border into both Belgium and Russia. On the 5th August 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia, and soon after both France and Britain declared war on Austria-Hungary. Thus the die was cast. Its ultimatum to Germany having been ignored, Britain had too declared war on Germany at 11pm on the 4th August 1914. Now, across Europe, began a frenzy of patriotism whereby young men, of all backgrounds and occupations, rushed to volunteer for their respective armies. The 'crusaders' were ready to go to war and the hounds of war, military, civil and clergy, were only too anxious to urge them on. Subsequently, the web of involved nations was to spread across the entire globe embracing all the continents except the uninhabited Antartic. And the supreme paradox of it all was that, in all probability, had Germany eschewed the route of war, and relied upon its unassailable mastery of innovation, technology and organisation, it would have become, during the early part 20th Century, the most powerful country in Europe, if not the world. One to whom all other European countries would be only too glad to play court, and some even willingly defer