The Suvla Bay Beachhead
By the summer of 1915, no notable progress had been achieved at either Cape Helles or Anzac Cove where the ANZAC were penned in under very difficult conditions of trench warfare. Casualties were beginning to soar due to the heat and waterborne and endemic diseases.
The arrival of the Field Marshal Kitchener's promised three divisions of troops changed the situation. Existing plans drawn up by General Birdwood, the ANZAC commander, to extend the Anzac Cove beachead were revived. Birdwood's plan was to advance to the north to take Sari Bari Ridge northeast of Anzec Cove.
This was merged into General Hamilton's overall plan to carry out a three-pronged offensive. First, a diversionary attack by the British and French of the Cape Helles perimeter; second, the breakout by the ANZAC from Anzac Cove towards Sari Bari Ridge; and, third, an amphibious landing 7km (5 miles) north of Anzac Cove at Suvla Bay that was thought to be only lightly defended by the Turks. (In the event there were only about 1,700 Turkish troops and five field guns posted to Suvla Bay). The majority of this force would link up with Birdwood's to make a combined force of around 60,000 men. This concentrated force was then to swing across country to divide the Peninsular into two and secure the northern shore of the Dardanelles Straits for the Allies. The Cape Helles operation would aim at keeping the Turks preoccupied in the south.
On the 6th of August 1915, at 2200 hours, the Suvla Bay Operation began under the command of General Sir Frederick Stopford. By morning, after some confusion due to poor reconnaissance and planning, it was completed and the troops established on the spacious beaches A, B and C around Suvla Bay. Movement off the beaches was delayed until the evening when some progress into the surrounding hills was made, but at a cost of 1,700 British casualties. Liman von Sanders rushed up five more divisions into the Sector anticipating the worst. The critical delay on the beaches was later blamed on Stopford who had stayed aboard his transport and failed to remain sufficiently in touch with his commanders.
Additionally, the now usual MEF commander's laxity in detailed planning and his lack of co-ordination between the three commanders of the offensive, had caused much of the confusion and delay.
General Stopfords's attack on Sulva Bay and beyond became benighted by an over cautious consolidation of the beachhead, and the tardy advance into the adjacent hills; all largely brought about by his lack of direction to his subordinates. He then made this situation much worse, he gave his troops a day of rest (8th August 1915) allowing the Turks to concentrate five divisions against his force.
The new commander of Cape Helles enclave, General W.H. Sitwell, overstepped his limited objectives of containment, and to make matters even more desperate, Birdwood, at Anzac Cove, did not fully appreciate the extent to which he was expected to support the extension of the Sulva Bay beachhead.
As a consequence, there were a whole series of tactical disasters. The Turks quickly reinforced their troops in the Suvla Bay Sector and occupied the heights of Tekke Tepe Ridge to the north of Suvla Bay and the higher ground at Anafarta Spur to the south. And, over the next few days, the Turkish forces repelled the uncoordinated British attacks and slowly closed in on the defences at the beachhead in Suvla Bay.
The only real benefit gained for the Allies was the conjunction of the two beachheads at Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay.
General Hamilton's patience with Stopford's operational failings finally ended, and Stopford was replaced by General H. de B. de Lisle. In addition, Divisional commands were given to in-coming veteran Western Fronters, but it was a poisoned chalice. Now the British commanders had two beleaguered beachheads with no obvious solution for a break out.
In what proved to be the last major battle on the Peninsular, the 29th Division was transported from the Cape Helles enclave to the Suvla Bay Sector. There it was joined by the 2nd Mounted Division newly arrived from Egypt and elements of the 11th Division. On the 21st August 1915, the British were to attack the W and Scimitar Hills in an attempt to break through to the beachhead at Anzac Cove. Meanwhile, Birdwood's ANZAC was to move onto Hill 60, a vital Turkish position.
The British attempts by 11th and 29th Divisions on the 21st August 1915 at the Turkish positions on W Hill, Scimitar Hill, both failed at a cost of 5,000 casualties. Birdwood's attack on Hill 60 made limited but tactically insignificant progress, although another earlier - 6th August 1915 - ANZAC sideshow attack at Lone Pine, even further south, was successful. It being noted for its six Victoria Cross awards won in an area only the size of a football pitch. It is also of note that the attack was launched through a tunnel; itself an amazing feat given the ground conditions.
Hamilton demanded yet more reinforcements to make up his recent losses of over 18,000 men and received a promise from the War Cabinet for a further 25,000. But in operational terms, he was bankrupt.
The Evacuation from the Beachheads
In October 1915, the first cracks appeared in the determination of the Dardenelles Committee to continue to support the Gallipoli Campaign. Additionally, pressure from the Australian Press for a solution to the situation was continuing and increasing.
On the 11th October 1915, General Hamilton, was asked to submit a plan for a complete evacuation. He did so, but was dismissive, saying it was, 'Unthinkable'; and claiming it would involve up to 50% casualties. There was also the question of national prestige. He was recalled on the 15th October 1915 and General Sir Charles Monro, commander on the Salonika Front, was sent out to give another opinion. After a whirlwind tour of the battlefields, Monro concurred with a total evacuation. In the words of Winston Churchill, 'He came. He saw. He capitulated.'
Field Marshal Kitchener decided to see the situation for himself, but he too agreed with the glum prognosis. The evacuation was on; General Birdwood was given the task of carrying it out.
The Withdrawal
The Birdwood Evacuation Plan depended on good weather, and the arctic blast that swept the Peninsular on, and around, the 27th November 1915 concentrated minds enormously. By the 8th December 1915, all was ready to evacuate Anzac Cove, Suvla and Cape Helles. The figures of men and quantities of material (much was destroyed or left behind) which had to be moved off the beachheads was staggering.
Men: Anzac Cove = 41,000; Suvla = 51,000; Cape Helles: = 43,000.
Horses/Mules: Anzac Cove = 2,400; Suvla = 3,000; Cape Helles; 9,000.
Artillery: Anzac Cove = 100+; Suvla; 90; Cape Helles: 200.
Such huge numbers had to be dealt with in a carefully staged withdrawal:
Preliminary: Reduction to the level necessary to maintain an over-the-winter holding action.
Intermediate: Reduction to levels adequate for a one-week holding action.
Total withdrawal. Evacuation of the remaining men and as many of the guns and as much of the material as possible. The material that could not be taken was to be disabled or destroyed. The evacuation of the non-combatant forces, the sick and the French colonials began on the 8th December 1915 and was carried out as if under normal rotation or evacuation procedures.
Next, between 11th and 19th December 1915, the troops from ANZAC and Suvla beachheads were evacuated at night via North Beach, the final parties burning the residual material as they left. Booby traps later killed many Turks.
After some delays due to operational problems, and the launch of an offensive by the Turks on the 7th January 1915 in the area between X and Y Beaches, the procedure was repeated from W and V Beaches for the Cape Helles troops on the 7th and 8th January 1915.
Not a single life was lost during the evacuation.
Were the Turks totally deceived? Some authorities say they were. Others believe they did know and, as perhaps the Germans did during the French Army mutiny in 1916, they chose not to react and let matters take care of themselves for the worse for the Allies, but with no further shedding of their own blood? There is, and is unlikely to be, a definitive answer to this conundrum.
The Tariff
N.B.: There are extraordinary variations in the figures on manpower and casualties that are given by the national authorities. Some are expressed to the last digit, which is implausibly precise in general, and incredible in the French and Turkish figures. Accordingly, it is thought judicious here to round off all numbers to an appropriate level of precision.
Troops involved in the Dardanelles Campaign:
Allied: British, French (including colonial Algerians, Moroccans and Senegalese), Australians, New Zealanders (including Maoris), Newfoundlanders, Indians, Singalese (English Tea Planters), Nepalese (Gurkhas), Russians and Palestinians/Syrians (Zion Mule Corps) = 480,000.
British = 320,000
ANZAC =78,000. Australians = 60,000; New Zealanders = 18,000.
French = 79,000
Turkish = 450,000
German = Not available.
OVERALL TOTAL = 940,000.
Casualties:
British = 120,000 (38%); Killed = 26,000 (8%).
ANZAC = 34,000 (44%); Killed = 10,000 (13%). Australian = 26,000 (43%); Killed = 7,600 (13%). New Zealanders = 7,600 (42%); Killed = 2,400 (13%).
French = 27,000 (34%); Killed = 8,000 (10%).
Turkish = 218,000 (48%); Killed = 87,000 (19%).
OVERALL TOTAL = 400,000 (43%); Killed = 130,000 (14%).
Postscript
It may be reasonably conjectured that had the skills employed in the highly efficient withdrawal from the Gallipoli Peninsular been present at the landings and in the offensives, the outcome of the whole Dardanelles Campaign would have been much more positive.
Post the Great War, and still continuing now, is the contention that the debacle of the Gallipoli and Dardanelles was due to failures by British politicians and senior generals, and the bulk of the fighting and dying was done by the ANZAC; particularly the Australians.
It is certainly true that the overall failure of the whole Dardanelles Campaign was almost entirely due to errors of omission and commission by the British - there were no top senior Australian or New Zealander ANZAC commanders, and the French were also subordinate.
However, it is certainly not true that the ANZAC collectively, or the Australians particularly, did the bulk of the fighting, or dying. Indubitably, this was the case at Anzac Cove, and no informed person would deny it, but it is definitely not true of the Gallipoli saga as a whole.
The figures given above amply show that the British had by far the largest number of the total Allied casualties and killed: respectively three and a half times and two and a half times that of ANZAC.
Also, it has to be said that whilst the New Zealanders represented only 30% of the Gallipoli ANZAC, they suffered the same percentage (13%) of their contingent killed as did the Australians. Their overall casualties were also roughly of the same proportion.
Indeed, there is a disparity between the percentage of casualties, and killed, between the British - 38%, 8% - and the ANZAC - 44% and 13% - respectively, but the vast majority of the ANZAC were highly exposed front line troops, whilst many of the British were engaged in potentially less hazardous support duties. So one would expect proportionally fewer British casualties overall.
Regrettably, it cannot be said that the lessons learned in the Dardanelles Campaign were quickly put into practice on the Western Front; the crude mass infantry charge remained the tactical solution to any military problem for many commanders. What can be said is that by 1918 the British Army, with the able and ready support of its Commonwealth comrades, had finally learned the lessons of modern warfare. Together, they went on to produce the greatest series of uninterrupted victories ever (The 100 Days Campaign of 1918) and made a huge contribution towards the Allies beating the Germans and winning the Great War.
