Introduction
As may be anticipated, the readership of the WFA Website extends far beyond the shores of the British Isles and, equally to be anticipated, the foreign view of events and individuals in the Great War do not always exactly co-incide with ours.
A frequent French browser of the WFA Website, Monsieur Marc Patiou, has been kind enough to make a few observations from his viewpoint on some perspectives of the war that have come to his notice.
1. Steel-helmets.
It is often stated, or implied, that the British steel helmet of the Great war, the so-called 'Brodie' bowler hat type, was the first to be introduced to the Western Front and that it was of a better design, and higher quality, than the French or German versions.
- The French Adrian steel helmet, based on the French fireman's helmet 'La Bourguignotte', and named after the general in charge of army logistics who forcibly promoted its introduction, was definitely the first on the Western Front when it was introduced in the late summer of 1915 in time for the Champagne Offensive.
- As regards its design, it is perhaps significant that some countries introduced similar models after 1920.
- As for the quality, it is indubiably true that the British Brodie was for the most part - but not always - made from forged steel, whereas the other combattant nations used steel plate. Logically, the former should be more resistant to projectiles than the German and French; the more rounded profile of the British helmet was, perhaps, also advantageous. Whether the British helmet was the better shape to protect the lower part of the head and neck from such projectiles, is another matter.
2. The French Army Mutinies of 1917.
Most accounts of the mutinies in the French Army in 1917 end by stating, with apparent amazement, that neither the German nor the Allies had an idea of their serious nature until after the event. This is most unlikely for the following reasons.
- Both the Germans and the British had an excellent intelligence network in both the military and civilian spheres - such as politicians and the Press - as the French espionage trials of 1918 attest.
- Ludendorff is quoted by Pedrochini as saying in his war memoires (in French, 'Souvenirs de Guerre' Vol II), "There were mutinies of which we perceived only distant echoes, and only later we clearly saw." It is not clear just how late was later.
On the 30th June 1917 - in the midst of the mutinies - a German newspaper, 'Landauer Anzieger' is quoted by Pedrochini as saying, "36th, 129th and 74th Infantry Regiments are supposed to have refused to return to the Front. Seditious speech is supposed to have taken place at Soissons". This was right in the heart-land of the mutiny. - For the Germans to strike when the troops were in mutiny would give the French troops - who had largely not left the trenches, but refused to undertake new offensives - good reason to fight again.
- Although, according to Pedroncini, only the minority of the mutineers promoted, or were in favour of, a revolutionary solution, the Germans thought that this radical minority could win the day against the moderates, as the Bolsheviks did against the Kerenski Government a few months later.
- By the Germans acknowledging that the mutinies had taken place, this would give good reason to the 95% of French soldiers - none of the other armed forces were involved - whom had not mutinied, for demanding the harsh punishment of the mutineers to bring the mutinies an early end. This summary action would have enabled French offensive action to begin again. (Although this solution through summary punishment could have been at the cost of strong resentment by the civil population at the erosion of democracy).
- However, to put the whole thing into perspective, it should be borne in mind that the official French records show that in the 50% of the Divisions where mutinies did take place, principally in the period July to August 1917, only a total of 40,000 soldiers were involved. In the remaining 50% of Divisions, there were no mutineers whatsoever; and there was no fighting between mutineer units and non-mutineer units. Even in the affected Divisions, the mutinies were sporadic and concerned collective disobedient behaviour in only parts of these divisions, be they as large as regiments or as small as individual companies. Many of those who did participate did so under duress from their more senior colleagues.
If too much publicity were given in Germany to the mutinies, it would encourage the German Social Democrat Party to increase their demands for immediate 'Peace Without Annexation', in contrast to the with the German Right Wing political class who wanted to keep their conquests of war - particularly the French coal-fields of Briey.
Such political struggles over the conduct of the war in 1918 are described in Kitchen's book, 'The German Offensives of 1918'. - It is most unlikely that the presence of numbers of ill-disciplined French soldiers running riot, and creating mayhem to property and person, in the streets of towns (like Chateau-Thierry) close to the Front-Line, was not reported to the German authorities; nor that the written accounts by French serving soldiers using the military censor-free 'civil' mail were not known about.
- There were no new German offensives at all on the French during the period of the mutinies, thus facilitating its spread and foment.
- On the British side, there was a conspiracy of silence from the British establishment and the Press, who surely knew of events from their own contacts and Front-Line correspondents. This silence arose from a fear of escalating the problem, or of creating a demand to 'abandon the collapsing French and bring the Army home'.
3. Death sentences carried out.
According to the official stastistics based on mandatory notifications of all executions - even in times of emergency - 500 death sentences were passed of which 50 were carried out. In every case the law provided for the defence counsel to be a civil lawyer.
4. The alleged French reluctance in learning, and adapting to, the lessons of war.
For the French, the turning point in the conversion of its army from a 19th Century model to a 20th Century one began in 1916; particularly so for the re-organisation of the infantry and for weapon development. Later developments in the war were largely derived from the initiatives of 1916. Kitchen, cited above, quotes Ludendorff writing in 1918, that he found…'the French Army to be operationally more skilful and flexible than their British allies'.
- The Brigade level was deleted. Division strength was reduced from four Regiments to three - thus from 12 battalions to nine. The fourth Rifle Company in every battalion was replaced by a Compagnie de Mitrailleuses (Machine Gun Company), with eight machine guns organised into two platoons.
- The 37mm TR, fast-firing, infantry weapon was introduced along with the (British) 81mm Stokes mortar. The former was eagerly adopted by the American Expeditionary Force. The 37mm TR. Model 1916 ('Tir Rapide' = Rapid Firing) fired shells of half a kilo, at up to 20 rounds a minute, at a maximum range of 2,500m and was highly mobile. It had a crew of seven. It proved to be the ideal weapon for disabling machine gun nests of the more extended defences of the later battles on the Western Front. The French soldiers called it 'The Little 75', it being half the size of the highly successful, rapid firing, 75mm light artillery gun.
- The first, world-wide, mass-produced, stamped steel, automatic weapon, the 1915, 8mm 'Chauchat', and the 'Vivien-Bessiere' rifle grenade device were introduced. The former was an early predecessor of the light automatic rifle and aimed to bring bringing increased firepower down to the level of the individual infantry squaddie. As early as 1916, the 'Chauchat' was distributed down to the platoon level. It is true that the early models were of dubious efficiency but it was exceptionally light and manoeuvrable in cramped spaces and it set the trend for subsequent light infantry automatic weapons. It is universally conceded that the 0,303in Chauchat which was produced for the American Expeditionary Force was not an operational success.
- The lay-out of the infantry platoon (then 40 men) was further modified to provide: two 'demie sections' - each commanded by a junior NCO - which were themselves subdivided to provide two 'escouades' led by a corporal or a private soldier. One of the 'demie-sections' was a bombing team plus two machine gun teams totalling 13 men plus the corporal. The second with 25 men and a corporal had two 'escouades' of 12 men each consisting of a three man rifle-grenade team and nine voltigeurs (skirmishers). The 'platoon leader team' had an officer, or senior NCO, with one or more runners detached from the Company HQ.
- The new layout of the infantry platoon reflected the recognition that French soldiers were not toy soldiers to be driven to battle by an omnipotent platoon commander, but rather men who would fight by their own motivation and abilities. The most effective men in the platoon being the group leaders - junior NCO's - who were usually drawn from a lower social class than the platoon leader. This rather brutal evolution in democracy was exemplified by the success at Verdun of such small independent units in seizing and holding vital terrain features.
- The fact that the French infantry spent the early part of the war in the highly unsuitable red and blue uniforms of the 19th Century has been much remarked upon. In fact, the new monochrome 'bleu horizon' (= horizon blue or light blue) uniforms were issued to new recruits and reinforcements to the Front Line as early as late Autumn 1914 and to all Front Line soldiers by the late Spring of 1915.
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