The Western Front Association: furthering interest in the Great War 1914-18 | explore | learn | share

And what of 'Plucky Little Belgium? IntroductionWhen we speak of the protagonists of the Western Front, we tend to talk of France, Britain (and its Empire) ranged against the Central Powers, with the United States being a rather reluctant (but none-the-less welcome) late comer. Rarely is much consideration is given to the role of Belgium in the conflict in Europe. In fact, in 1914, its army on the Western Front was significantly stronger, numerically, than the British having six divisions against the BEF's five. As the war progressed the Belgian Army stabilised to a force of around 120,000 men. There was no effective Navy and the airforce only peaked to a maximum force of 140 aircraft in 1918. RationaleThe principal reasons for the relative anonymity of this Third Arm of the Entente are not hard to find. Belgium was a different and difficult ally. Firstly, it never budged from its long acclaimed status of neutrality: it never declared war on Germany and did not sign the Pact of London in September 1914 (i.e. after the outbreak of war). This pact set out the understanding that none of the members of the Entente would sue for a separate peace with the Central Powers. Indeed, the only reason why the Belgians did not do so, was because the German High Command refused to offer one with terms and conditions that were known to be acceptable to Belgium. Secondly, the Belgian Army was under the direct command of the King of the Belgians, Albert I, (born 1875). The King made no secret of his intention to use his constitutional prerogative to ensure that his army was dedicated to taking a purely defensive role on the Western Front: And that is precisely the role it eventually undertook. Failing in its self-appointed role as the advance guard of the Entente armies at the outbreak of war, the Belgian army had quickly lost any initiative it may have had. By the end of August 1914, with the sporadic support of the Entente, it had retreated to its national stronghold at Antwerp. Despite the rather desperate support of the British - famously including the Royal Naval Division of pensioners and new recruits - in the subsequent siege, in October 1914 the majority of the Belgian army was driven into a headlong retreat to the North Sea. There, between Ypres and Dixmude, in the north west corner of the country, it set up a purely defensive, but solid, enclave behind defenses formed by the breaching of the banks of the Yser River. It remained in a purely defensive posture in this tiny corner of Belgium until the King led his, and the Allied troops assigned to him by Foch, in a successful breakout in August 1918. Thirdly, despite the spirited attempts of the Belgian government, encouraged by the other members of the Entente, to involve the Belgian forces more actively in the war on the northern sector of the Western Front, King Albert retained firm control of the Belgian army. Throughout all but the very end of the four years of the war, he was unshakeable in maintaining his prerogative to pursue a separate and distinct pro-Belgian military and diplomatic policy. This attitude persisted despite Belgium's high dependence on the Entente for military, financial, logistic and other forms of aid without which it surely would have collapsed. (From 1915 onwards Belgian soldiers wore uniforms made from British army khaki cloth along with French gas-masks and steel-helmets). The King even went so far as to let it be known that not only did he not wish to put the lives of his troops in danger by pursuing a more aggressive strategy, he also wanted any offensive action by the Entente to be directed elsewhere. He insisted that the Belgian sector of the Western Front be protected from further devastation. Inevitably, this caused friction and the eventual isolation from his Entente allies. Effectively, from 1915 to mid-1918, Belgium was excluded from most of the discussions and decisions on the prosecution of the war. In mitigation it has to be admitted that costly and largely unproductive offensives in the Ypres Salient, at Verdun and on The Somme, would be unnerving to any ally. Additionally, there were rankling memories of Joffre's generally disastrous and costly handling of the unexpected German offensive through Belgium in the earliest days of the war. To further add to the rancour was Joffre's and General French's, insensitively handled attempts to relieve the King of his command and to absorb the Belgian forces into the French Army command structure. Moreover, the King felt strongly that the French, and to a lesser extent the British, had generally failed to provide what the Belgians considered was warranted and expected support in the early battles of 1914. This catalogue of failures had, from the outset, weakened the belief of the Belgians that the Entente had the measure of the Central Powers. It also induced in them the conviction that the only way the conflict could be resolved, without the total destruction of Belgium, was by treaty and not military action. As the various offensives in 1916/17 of the Entente ground to an unsuccessful bloody stalemate, the negative attitude of King Albert progressively hardened; as to a lesser extent did, at least initially, that of the Belgian government and people. But in 1918, after the chaos and desperation of the Ludendorff Offensive, the appointment of Marshal Foch as the Allied Commander-in-Chief and changes in the Belgian government, the King accepted the command of the Flanders Army Group in September 1918. Subsequently, the Belgian army fully participated in the final rout of the Great Powers in the autumn of 1918. PostscriptumParadoxically, the uncooperative attitude of the King towards the Entente had remained largely unknown to the general population of the Entente nations and he remained a universally admired figure until his accidental death in 1934.