Introduction
When the first 120,000 men of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) crossed the English Channel to France, in August 1914, it was in all senses of the word a Regular Army, and well trained in the basic military craft of the time. However, based as it was on the principles and requirements for the fighting of the many small wars of Empire that it had frequently fought across the globe, it was lightly armed and equipped for a colonial type war against lightly armed natives. It was not manned or equipped to fight a long continental war against a well-trained and equipped conscript army millions strong. Its soldiers have been aptly described as being likened to well trained, but lightly armed, estate gamekeepers.
To command this expeditionary army, which was to expand to a size almost beyond imagination over the following four years of continuous fighting, there was an officer corps initially around 5,000 strong.
As the war intensified on the Western Front it rapidly changed from the customary open cavalry and artillery backed infantry warfare to that of static trench based fighting. Concomitantly, it rapidly became apparent that the BEF troops lacked much of the necessary munitions and equipment for this more intense industrialised type of total warfare. Also, the more senior members of officer corps – the generals - were failing to manage the war efficiently and were rashly expending these scarce resources of material and men.
Considerations, causes and effects
Social Class: At the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, the majority of the British high commanders on the Western Front were drawn from the aristocracy and the land-owning classes, with an ever-increasing leavening of the wealthy middle class. Overall, more than half of the officer cadets recruited pre-1914 were from military families; often with decades of service to the Crown. Most senior officers had private incomes and did not depend entirely on their military, or navy, pay to maintain the required life style. Without this personal income to meet the officer's messing fees and other life-style costs, it was exceedingly difficult for the ambitious officer in the British army in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries to maintain the expected standards.
However, such were the losses of both junior and senior officers on the Western Front as the War went on, an ever increasing number of commissions and promotions were awarded to the middle class and also the battle experienced soldiers of the working class. A few of these reached the higher ranks (if only for The Duration) during the Great War. (See below Service history of British and Empire army commanders).
Although the shabby and ill-reputable practice buying of military and naval commissions had long since ended in 1871, high rank was usually not achieved entirely by merit. More often it depended on seniority or preference arranged by royalty, relatives, friends and other members of the influential social classes. A case in point is the promotion of Sir General Douglas Haig to Commander of the BEF in December 1915. Haig's wife was a maid of honour to both Queen Victoria and Queen Alexandra. It was believed by many at the time that it was through her contacts with the royal family that Douglas Haig was able to maintain from his current post in France a personal and confidential correspondence during 1914/15 with King George V. This personal correspondence, it is conjectured, played a significant part in expediting General Sir John French's dismissal from the post of Commander of the BEF, and Haig's appointment to that post in December 1915.
The principles of war: The philosophy of war that was strongly adhered to by all the generals of the Western Front was that of the 'Frontal Attack' – an en masse attack on a limited front by the infantry supported by the cavalry and the artillery. This continued into the world of trench warfare and led to the famous British Western Front scenario of 'Going Over the Top' when huge numbers of infantry left their trenches and were thrown against the entrenched enemy infantry across a bullet and shell strewn 'No Man's Land'. In the face of the enemy barbed wire defences, the machine guns and the artillery, the death tolls were enormous as the pathetically vulnerable British infantry advanced across No Man's Land. Serge fabric battle-dress uniforms offered little resistance to the rifled machine gun bullet or jagged shell splinter. The majority of the unprecedented – before or since - death roll of 19,000 of the British infantry on the first day of the First Battle of the Somme was attributed to the German machine-gunners emerging unscathed from the preparatory artillery barrage. The British troops had been expressly assured by their commanders that the unprecedented Preparatory Barrage would annihilate all German resistance in situ. An almost 'walk-over' situation was envisaged by many British commanders.
The reverse of this philosophy of frontal attack was the immediate response of the 'Counter Attack'. However, in practice, this was a tactic more strongly favoured by the French and Germans; often to their considerable cost.
Later on in the war, when the ever rising casualty lists became a political as well as a military consideration, the feasibility of an offensive was judged by the "estimated acceptable percentage of casualties." For some commanders this was consistently significantly higher than others, earning them the nickname of 'Butcher'. Haig also earned this sobriquet among many of the British and Empire soldiery of the Western Front. Perhaps it was engendered, in part, by his comment in June 1916, just before the First Battle of the Somme, "The nation must be taught to bear losses".
Age of appointment to commander: As mentioned earlier, traditionally the commanders of British armies were appointed to high rank by seniority and degree of influence; occasionally merit was taken into consideration. Hence the commander of the British forces in the Crimea – Lord Raglan – was 67 years of age and most of his commanders were in their 60's and 70's. They were also mostly his relatives. Given the difficulties and length of the Crimean campaign, it is difficult to see how he and his field commanders could maintain anything like an effective and sustained performance. Indeed, some of them passed much of their time ensconced in their personal luxurious yachts stationed offshore of the peninsular. Lord Cardigan of the 'Charge of the Light Brigade' fame being a prime example; he was also Raglan's brother-in-law.
When he arrived on the Western Front with the BEF in August 1914, Field Marshal John Denton Pinkstone French was 62 years of age; Haig, at 54, was somewhat younger when he took overall command in December 1915. In most modern armies the field commanders are in their 40's and early 50's. In the Israeli army generals are retired at 40 years of age. On the French side in the Great War, Generals Joffre and Foch were 62 and 63 years old respectively in 1914, and served throughout the Great War.
Service history of British and Empire army commanders: Almost all the senior British Army generals on the Western Front had served since they received their commission in the various colonial military campaigns of the British Empire. As a consequence many bore the injuries of these colonial wars and the depredations of tropical disease and its medications. Some were indubitably alcoholics and/or drug addicts; others were possibly insane.
Additionally, after the urgent recall to duty of many retired officers in the tense and fraught days of the early part of the Great War, a significant number of these so-called 'dug-outs' were found to be unwilling commanders, or incompetent due to age and/or disability. After inflicting considerable collateral damage on the BEF and its men, many had to be returned to retirement, enforced or otherwise.
It was not until the latter years of the Great War that wastage and political expediency meant that the younger generals were given their own senior commands on the Western Front. Two outstanding examples were the Australian, General John Monash, and the Canadian, General Arthur William Currie, who were respectively Commanders of Australian and Canadian Corps. Neither of these men had notable civil or military precedents and reputations before the Great War, but both amassed a formidable record of military success in the latter years of the War.
Some of the long service BEF senior commanders did manage to largely avoid the more serious operational errors and disasters – if not always entirely – whilst acquiring the attributes of what today would be called the school of "Lessons Will Be Learned/Practices Will Be Modified". These commanders managed to retain their posts and attain some highly creditable successes on the battlefield. Most without the profligate destruction of the men under their charge. Several even rejoiced under the fond nickname of Father, or Daddy, being so endowed by their grateful soldiers. Overall, these generals finished the war with enhanced reputations. Good examples were: Plumer, Birdwood, Allenby, Horne and Dorrien-Smith. However, the latter general was classic case of a wrongful dismissal of a good commander, early in the Great War, due to the personal antipathy and jealousy of Field Marshal French. A fate which was not all that unusual because of the prima donna-ish and self-serving attitude that was often associated with high command in the British Army on the Western Front.
Fraternisation: Historically, the British junior army regimental officer has always been expected "To put the welfare of his infantrymen, first". This paternal philosophy is well portrayed in the ITV programme 'My Boy Jack' which graphically tells the story of the death of Rudyard Kipling's 18-year old son (a neophyte lieutenant in the Irish Guards) at Loos in 1915. Conversely, in the French Army many of the junior officers studiously avoided all contact with their men unless actually taking them into action. (However, on these specific occasions, these same officers were often suicidally brave when leading their men). Consequently, the French NCO's were generally expected to take care of the troops with very little help or guidance from their regimental officers.
It is a moot point at which level of command was it that British officers became deliberately more remote from the men under their command on the Western Front. But certainly at the level of battalion adjutant a gulf started to appear and the definition of 'Officer and Other Ranks' became a tangible and impenetrable barrier. By the time the ordinary Great War soldier encountered the level of Divisional commander, the gulf was there for all to see: often the men in a Division did not know their commander's name and had rarely, if ever, seen him. And even if they had, it was perhaps only as a distant figure on a parade ground, or on a hurried visit to the Front Line. Of course there were exceptions, but not that many. The oft-quoted axiom that "It takes only weeks to train a Common Soldier, but decades to train a General" influenced many senior officers to avoid the constant dangers of the Front Line.
The red tabbed senior officers at the HQ command level became known as the 'Staff', or the 'Brass', and for all intents and purposes lived a life at a remote distance from the Front. The egocentric military shenanigans depicted in the Blackadder TV programme were exaggerated for comic effect, but doubtless rang a bell of verity for many a Great War veteran.
The Staff were considered to lead a different and rather glamorous life when compared with the deprivations and dangers endured by the officers and men in the Front Line. The most senior commanders usually lived in somewhat splendid isolation with their Staff in a requisitioned chateau, or prominent building that could be 30 miles or so distant from the Front. The French Field Marshal Joffre considered his break for lunch, and a postprandial nap, as absolutely sacrosanct under all conditions of war. He even took around with him his personal chef and kitchen to ensure his culinary comforts were properly catered for.
At the time of an offensive, or heavy fighting, the means of communication by telephone, or radio, of the officer commanding could be completely cut off by enemy action. Apart from messages carried by carrier pigeon, or Regimental Runner, he frequently had no real idea what was happening to his command in the field for hours or, even days, at a time. There are many instances where this lack of communication and control of events – i.e. the First Battle of the Somme – produced military disasters of an almost unimaginable scale, loss of life and tactical defeat.
A story of military corruption is well told in the Stanley Kubric film 'Paths of Glory'. Here a futile offensive was launched to capture a specific cherished target as the result a promise of promotion. This promise was given by the senior commander to a compliant commanding officer dependent upon his achieving a successful outcome of the attack by his men. Such tales of a blatant self-serving attitude are not considered by many military observers to be necessarily apocryphal.
Military technocrats: The senior Western Front commanders had matured in a military world ruled by the dual exotic skills of the cavalry and the artillery assisted by the more plebeian-like infantry. In the twenty years preceding the Great War, the main improvement in technology in the British Army was that provided by the introduction of the Short Magazine Lee Enfield (SMLE) rifle. This significantly improved the firepower of the infantry battalion at 15 accurately aimed shots per minute.
In 1914, the British Army only possessed minimal quantities of High Explosive (H.E.) shells and relied almost entirely on the 100+ year old technology of shrapnel firing artillery pieces, plus a few mortars and howitzers. It was not until 1916 that reasonable quantities of more reliable shells were available across all sectors of the Western Front. Also, in late 1914/early 1915, the specialised matériel needed for static trench warfare was minimal in quantity and rudimentary at best, and rarely as efficacious as that available to the German Army.
Haig's dismissal of the machine gun in 1915 – "The machine gun is a much over-rated weapon" - is indicative of the prevailing conservative frame of mind in the British command structure about the recent advances in military technology. It is true that faced by the advent of the British prototype tank in 1915, Haig more readily saw the potential of this new weapon. But either through his maladministration, or acquiescence to the more negative stance of the War Office and its minions and officers at GHQ itself, he ensured that the 'tactical surprise' of the tank was largely lost through its premature deployment in inadequate numbers. Haig also stood by whilst the more dynamic technical, strategic and tactical wartime innovators (such as Col. Ernest Dunlop Swinton, Royal Engineers) were deliberately sidelined by lesser inspired commanders, administrators and even politicians. Accordingly, the promised maximum effect of the tank was delayed until the latter months of the war.
It may also be reasonably implied that the appearance of toxic gas warfare on the Western Front in 1915 was in part due to the confidence of the Germans that the British Command was totally unprepared for its use on the battlefield. And that a huge strategic and tactical advantage could be achieved by its surprise deployment. However, there was clear physical evidence that the British knew in advance of German plans and preparations for a gas attack on the Western Front and that they had had an understanding of its evil potential. But the information was not acted upon and no anti-toxic gas prevention measures were taken by the BEF commanders until after the first gas cylinder fuelled attack at Ypres.
Conclusion
The British participants of the Great War on the Western Front were products of the British society of the time where the royal subject knew, and largely accepted, his place. Whilst the Upper Classes firmly believed in their God-given right to rule and to be treated with due deference by the Lower Orders.
These rules of society readily spilled over into the mores of Field Marshal Lord Kitchener's million strong volunteer Citizen's Army as dictated by centuries of civil and military practice and an ingrained obedience to the Law of the Land. This bond was reinforced by the almost universal wish of all concerned to maintain strong family ties and show avid loyalty to friends and comrades at arms. In the latter case there was a very strong feeling in the trenches of the Western Front of "We are all in this together." Of which the fates of so-called 'Pals Battalions' are a graphic and tragic paradigm.
In the hellish life of the trenches, this intricate bonding of the nation largely remained firm as men faithfully stayed at their designated posts and served until they were killed, mutilated beyond capability of service, transferred elsewhere, or saw it through to the end of the War. Certainly, the junior officers drawn from the Upper Classes clearly played their part in the struggle: greater percentages of them died than did the common soldiers they commanded. Even the Royal Family was touched by death and mutilation of their men-folk in action on the Western Front. And somewhat surprisingly, it has been stated that over 30 of the 1,200 Western Front Generals actually died on active service.
Unfortunately, within this class ridden background, incompetent officers were permitted to retain their posts and responsibility by virtue of their rank, position and influence in the army and society, whilst new and better practices and ideas were shunned by ignorance and over-conservative reactions. Moreover, these senior commanders routinely acted with a degree of personal independence of action that would be quite unacceptable in today's army. The teetotal VI Corps commander, Major General Victor Wentworth Odlum, consistently banned his men from partaking of the regulation daily two-tablespoons-full issue of the morale raising rum ration. A privilege that dated from the severe winter of 1914/15. General Odlum was never censured by higher commanders for the illegal and unforgivable deprivation of this well deserved and cherished boon. His enforced substitute for his men's lost rum-ration was a serving of pea soup or lime juice.
