Pen and Sword, 2010
ISBN 978 1 84884 253 3
(hardback 152pp; Illustrations and maps)
In 1995, the late Trevor Pidgeon's important and detailed study of the first use of tanks on 15 September 1916 at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette was published to acclaim. It was considered an exemplar of what the diligent ‘amateur' could produce and a work that materially helped develop our collective understanding of the conflict on the Western Front during the First World War. The book was meticulously researched, with text and references of the highest standard. The accompanying map volume was well-produced and the maps themselves detailed (hardly surprising, given Pidgeon's interest in, and knowledge of, cartography). Importantly, the maps materially helped in clarifying which tanks fought where and what their individual fates were in the fighting. The Tanks at Flers remains essential reading for those interested in the development and use of tanks in the First World War and for anyone considering the events of what Douglas Haig had hoped would be the battle that broke German resistance on the Somme in 1916.
As is explained in the foreword to Tanks on the Somme, which gives a similar detailed treatment to the lesser-known (but in my view equally important) tank actions that followed the first occasion of their use, this research and the manner of its presentation were typical of Trevor Pidgeon. David Fletcher of the Tank Museum stresses that Pidgeon not only collated "material from dusty archives", but walked the ground, flew over it and followed up "every lead, however obscure it might seem to be". Perhaps to some extent these facts help account for the considerable gap between the publication of The Tanks at Flers and this work. Whether or not that is the case, this ‘sequel' is welcome.
The book deals with the tank actions that took place between late September and mid-November 1916, during which period tanks were usually employed individually or in small numbers - in what is usually cast in negative terminology as ‘penny-packets'. Because of the small numbers involved, the relatively insignificant achievements of most operations in which tanks participated and the desire by advocates of armoured warfare (both during and, most particularly, after the war) to focus on the occasions upon which tanks were employed en masse, these tank operations have received little attention. However, in fact, this was an extremely important period in the development of the tank as part of the British Expeditionary Force's all-arms tactical and weapons system.
Precisely because of the limited numbers of tanks available, infantry units allotted them for co-operation in operations for limited objectives began to learn how to use the tank effectively in the role that, at this early stage in its development, was the only one to which it was suited (and not well suited at that): as an infantry close-support weapon. The Mark I tank, with a complicated transmission and steering mechanism and a maximum speed slower than the infantryman in the advance, was entirely unfitted to any operation which did not tie it closely to the infantry attack. Its mechanical unreliability meant operations could not (and as GHQ was soon stressing, should not) be planned and launched that depended for their success on tank participation. Having developed this understanding from analysis of the first occasions of their use, it was now for the BEF to learn how best to make use of their admitted strengths without suffering too much the consequences of their obvious shortcomings. Those occasions where these twin goals were achieved were exceptional in 1916 e.g. the actions at Gird Trench on 26 September and near Beaumont Hamel on 14 November, but each occasion of their use helped to inform an understanding of this wholly-new weapon.
Pidgeon's forensic analysis of these actions highlights the vague orders, the unrealistic expectations of tanks amongst some, and the words of caution from on high regarding the unreliability of the tanks themselves. The interpretation of events is practical and balanced and certainly accords with my own analysis of the sources. In addition, there is sensibly no definitive answer to a question where a definitive conclusion can't be reached, only a clear laying down of where the evidence found points to a probability. This is particularly the case with the events of actions like the one at Bayonet Trench on 18 October 1916. It is too often the case that a few pieces of evidence are put together as ‘definite proof' of what can only, in fact, be an assumption. This is not true of this book.
One is left with a feeling of intense admiration for the officers and men who crewed these first tanks and a sense of wonder that they managed to make any meaningful contribution at all. They undoubtedly did, however, and the excellent field guides at the end of each chapter will be a joy for those visiting the battlefields who want to follow in the tracks of the tanks.
As for the negatives, disappointingly no amount of care or attention seems to have been lavished on the photographs (which are not referenced) and maps; there is no bibliography, and the lack of footnote references for some material means there's no adequate way to follow up on sources quoted in the text. An inadequate footnote being as valueless as no footnote at all, this is unsatisfactory.
We ought to be beyond this kind of thing now. In this regard, since Pidgeon's earlier book was so well referenced and presented, it seems the publisher has failed to attend to the things that would have done justice to the otherwise excellent research the book contains and to the memory of a talented historian who was clearly no ‘amateur'. Nevertheless, this book is recommended for its diligent research and brisk writing style.
Reviewed by: Bryn Hammond
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