Welcome to the first "post summer" meeting of the Yorkshire WFA. I hope everyone has had a relaxing break. I have great pleasure in welcoming Foster Summerson who will talk to us on "The Defence and Capture of Roeux, April - May 1917". The Battle of Arras is, I believe an overlooked campaign, and I am sure that Foster's presentation will help make this important battle more prominent.

Please note the change of speaker for October - due to Michael Hickey not being able to make the visit to York as planned, however, we have had plenty of notice of Michael's absence and have therefore secured a popular replacement - details appear below.

Finally, although it is only early September and Christmas seems a long way off, we need to consider if we are to have a Christmas meal after the December meeting here, in the college. I should have the menu available for the October meeting, when a booking will need to be made.

Brian Marsden

Forthcoming Speakers:

3 October: (Note this is change to the previously advertised speaker)

"Not Again: The German attack on the Aisne, May 1918" - Peter Hart

The 50th Division had been harried from pillar to post in 1918. They had been the first reserves rushed to the scene in the great German attack of 21 March. After ten days of murderous fighting they were in tatters and sent for a rest to Northern France. Here they were the reserve division caught up in the second great German offensive in the River Lys sector. Once again they fell back fighting all the way but few were left standing when they were finally relieved. Now they were sent to recuperate in the Chemin des Dames sector. Here surely they would be safe - the area had been quiet for over a year in May 1918. Then the third great German offensive was launched - on the Chemin des Dames and across the River Aisne. This was the end - but they fought bravely but the division was smashed almost out of existence.

7 November: In the shadow of Ivor Maxse: Solly-Flood and training in the BEF Alistair Geddes

Training in the BEF is a much neglected subject. What little is known is dominated by the figure of Sir Ivor Maxse. This talk examines the forgotten figure of Arthur Solly-Flood, the head of the Training Directorate in 1917, and assesses his contribution to the development of the BEF's tactical doctrine and his role in improving its training system.

Raising the Standard: War Graves in the UK (from the CWGC web site)

War graves can be found in almost every single burial ground the length and breadth of the United Kingdom, some 170,000 casualties in over 12,500 locations. Many of the men and women who died in the United Kingdom were laid to rest by their families in their local churchyard or cemetery. The Commission relies heavily on local and church authorities to maintain the graves on our behalf and standards of care vary greatly.

Recently, our Commissioners expressed concerns about the standard of maintenance in some UK sites. Following this, the Commission's team of inspectors visited every site in the country and rated its overall standard of care. The vast majority of sites were acceptable but unfortunately a small number gave cause for concern. It is these burials grounds which the Commission must target and which we seek help in improving the appearance, not only of the war graves but of the whole location.

The Commission is continuing to make contact with various voluntary organisations, local groups and army cadets to see if they would be able to help us in initial clearance followed by ongoing maintenance of the poorly maintained sites containing war graves. We would also like to encourage schools and local communities to take interest in the war graves located in their local churchyards and cemeteries.

The National Probation Service is one organisation which is very enthusiastic about the Commission's Community Involvement Project. They feel it will provide offenders with an opportunity to gain a historical perspective of the bravery and sacrifices of their ancestors, whilst also ensuring that appropriate respect is given to them in their final resting place. Work has already started in South Wales, Greater Manchester and Hampshire. Their main role will be to clear the overgrown and neglected sites. Once the initial tidying up work has been done, teams of offenders will then continue to provide ground maintenance to these sites.

A spokesperson for the National Probation Service's Unpaid Work team in Greater Manchester said "This is a unique project for us, and one we are very proud to have the opportunity to be involved with.  We aim to provide a high standard of work that will ultimately be of all-round benefit - to the burial grounds involved, the War Graves Commission, the community and the offenders."

Letter from War Memorials Trust

Dear Mr Marsden,

As you may know, War Memorials Trust works for the protection and conservation of war memorials across the UK. I am writing from the charity as we seek to raise awareness of war memorial issues. War Memorials Trust hopes that your members may be interested in war memorials. Often those with an interest in military history are involved with war memorials. They start campaigns for restoration of their local war memorial or contact the Trust for advice on who to report concerns to. The Trust is therefore seeking to raise awareness of how we can help amongst WFA members and branches.

Your branch members can help in several ways:

1. Keep an eye on local war memorials and let the Trust know if they have any concerns about their condition.

2. As a charity that relies entirely on voluntary funding (we receive no government support) we are also always keen to find new supporters. Individuals or branches can join at the same rates of £20 annual membership or £100 life subscription or anyone can make a donation.

3. Have a look at our website or Bulletin to find out about the Trust and spread the word about our work.

Further information on the Trust can be found at www.warmemorials.org. Alternatively please do not hesitate to contact me for additional information, to organise a speaker or to get your details added to our mailing list to receive our Bulletin. I can be reached on 020 7259 0403 or This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .

Kind regards,

Nancy Treves, Administrator

Branch Lecture Series - June 2009:

Professor Peter Simkins ‘The Battle of the Selle, October 1918'

Sir Douglas Haig always believed in the judgement of the man on the spot, but after the losses to the BEF during the actions of 1914 and 1915, the BEF was ‘deskilled' in this judgement during the build up to the Battle of the Somme during 1916. This lack of experienced commanders encouraged the centralisation of command and control of the battlefield. Even the importance of artillery took this into account as divisional artillery was concentrated and co-ordinated at Corps level, a crucial part of planning any operation. By 1917 the BEF was adopting a more managerial style with divisional and brigade commanders playing a bigger role in the planning of offensives. 1918 saw the big change - semi-open warfare was only fluid if command and control was devolved downwards to divisional and brigade commanders. Two of the most influential commanders in the Hundred Days offensives of Fourth Army were Major-General ED Budworth (GOC RA Fourth Army) and Major-General AA Montgomery (MGGS Fourth Army).

After the crossing of the Hindenberg Line in September, the German resistance stiffened and for a while it looked as if Foch's autumn offensive would grind to a halt in this sector. The German Army took up a new position along the River Selle, close to Le Cateau (the site of the August 1914 battle of II Corps during the Retreat to the Marne).  When Rawlinson's Fourth Army reached the River Selle in October 1918, they were faced with three problems - crossing the river itself, the railway embankment on the far side and the ridge above the embankment. The decision was made to commence the assault at night, and as the river was not so very wide at this point, planks would be used for the soldiers to cross in single file. Late pontoons would be required for the artillery to cross the river.

Fourth Army took two weeks to prepare for the battle which was to be an attack along a ten mile front. Rawlinson left the planning to his two Corps commanders: TLN Morland (XIII Corps) and Walter Braithwaite (IX Corps). Morland still in place since 1916, Braithwaite newly promoted from command of 62nd Division. In XIII Corps the divisional commanders were HC Jackson (50th Division) and HK Bethell (66th Division), Bethell was, at 35, the youngest British divisional commander. Bethel was not the only ‘new type' of commander, the Brigade commanders in Morland's Corps were all in their own way extraordinary: PM Robinson (GOC 149 Brigade); George Rollo (GOC 150 Brigade) was a marine engineer who had joined the army as a civilian and served as a captain in the Liverpool Pals before promotion (civilian to Brigadier-General in four years!);  Richard Sugden (GOC 151 Brigade) was a corn miller's son who had played Rugby League for Brighouse Rangers and Yorkshire (who would have thought there would be a General in the Great War who had played Rugby League!) who was in the Imperial Yeomanry and  was  commissioned from the ranks during the Boer War. He went to war with the 49th (West Riding) Division in 1915.

Facing XIII Corps were three German divisions, the 17th Reserve, the 204th Infantry Division and the 243rd Infantry division (both 204th and 243rd were Württemberg divisions and reckoned to be first rate).

The attack took place during the night of the 17 October and continued until 20 October. After crossing the river in fog, the battle developed into a dog fight. In the morning the three brigades were thoroughly mixed up. Unlike earlier battles when time would have been lost while men were sorted back into their original brigades, these three brigade commanders carried on directing the battle, each instructing the battalions closest to their command posts. This was far better organisation than existed in the German lines were time was lost re-organising the men!

Further south the divisions in Braithwaite's IX corps were experiencing the same battle conditions. Here Braithwaite had left the organising to his divisional commanders: EP Strickland (1st Division), TO Marden (6th Division) and GF Boyd (46th Division). Of these commanders Gerald Boyd stands out as being different - he joined the Devonshire Regiment in 1895 as a private soldier, was commissioned into the East Yorkshire Regiment in 1900, began the Great War as Brigade Major in Hunter-Weston's 11 Brigade and finally promoted GOC 46th Division in September 1918. In this night attack Boyd was instructed to carry out ‘Chinese' deception manoeuvres - lots of movement and shelling but not actually taking part in the battle.

Opposing IX Corps were four German divisions - 3rd Naval Division which lost 50% of its men; 5th Reserve (Brandenberg) Division which lost 75 as casualties;  15th Reserve (Rhineland) Division which was effectively destroyed as a fighting unit; 24th (Royal Saxon) Division which lost 3,000 men in total.

Considering the battle as a whole, the plan was excellent, the deception worked, Rawlinson left his Corps commanders to concentrate the bulk of the action in a narrow section and pinched out the strong point at the Andigny Forest. Only the 6th Division had mixed results, all the other division achieved their objectives. The effects of the artillery during this battle have often been exaggerated - the counter-battery fire was as effective as earlier battles. The battle was won by the infantry advancing in fog and surprising the Germans who were in excellent positions along the embankment and below the ridge. It is also assumed, mistakenly, that there had been a collapse in German morale at this stage in the war. This just was not true as the casualty rates in both armies are still high. In the BEF they are comparable to the casualty rate during the Battle of Arras, 1917.

These new tactics used by the BEF - combined all arms battles with limited objectives - kept the Germany army occupied. The number of German divisions facing the Third and Fourth Armies was greater than any other place on the front line on the Western Front. The German high command had moved more men up from the Meuse-Argonne having identified the BEF as their most dangerous opponents. This is one of reasons for the rapid success of the Franco-American offensive in the Meuse-Argonne area, the density of German divisions on their front was lower and they had fewer reserves.

As the BEF pushed the Germans back during Foch's autumn offensive we call the Hundred Days, the average soldier could expect to ‘go over the top' with a greater frequency than in earlier battles e.g. the Somme in 1916. On average, a soldier could expect to be sent into the attack at least five times during the Hundred Days. This is very different to the average Somme survivor who would have experienced three attacks in three and a half months.

After the Battle of the Selle was run down, Haig instructed his army commanders to prepare for the next attack. We know this as the Battle of the Sambre, the last offensive before the Armistice in November 1918.

Peter Palmer

This newsletter has been prepared by David Tattersfield.

Any opinions contained in this are his and do not necessarily reflect those of the committee as a whole.